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Abstract 
Modern Information System (IS) development supports different techniques for business process 
modelling. Recently Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) has become a standard that allows 
modellers to visualise organizational business processes. However, despite the fact that BPMN is a good 
approach to introduce and understand business processes, there is no opportunity to address security 
concerns while analysing the business needs. This is a problem, since both business processes and 
security concerns should be understood in parallel to support a development of the secure systems. In 
current thesis we introduce the extensions for BPMN 2.0 regarding security aspects. The following  
proposal is based on alignment of the modelling notation with IS security risk management (ISSRM).We 
apply a structured approach to understand major aspects of BPMN and propose extensions for security 
risk management based on the BPMN alignment to the ISSRM concepts. We demonstrate the use of 
extensions, illustrating how the extended BPMN could express assets, risks and risk treatment on few 
running examples related to the Internet store assets’ confidentiality, integrity and availability. We 
believe that our proposal would allow system analysts to understand how to develop security 
requirements to secure important assets defined through business processes.  
We also attempt to observe the following approach in the broader sense and we open a possibility 
for the business and security model interoperability and the model transformation between BPMN and 
another modelling approach also aligned to ISSRM, Secure Tropos.  
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
The concept of security stands for ability of a product to protect information and data from the 
illegal access, performed by any unauthorized person or system in order to change, read or delete it. The 
research papers and experiences described in security knowledge domain show that the process of 
security integration into the information systems is not completely and appropriately understood. The 
analysis of security requirements is usually performed during system maintenance and implementation 
stages, meaning that the business process defined at early stages theoretically excludes consideration of 
security (Jürjens, 2005). That leads to the following problem; the security engineers receive little 
feedback about the needs for system security. And considering the idea that risks are difficult to 
calculate, this in turn increases the possibility of successful attack being reproduced in some other 
component of the security-critical systems. 
The business process understanding and modelling in allows analysing needs and purposes of 
proposing services that we consider and use in practise in every kind of business. We believe that early 
consideration of security in business processes allows system and security analysts to define and 
investigate potential threats, study risks and its impacts, and also design and plan countermeasures, 
which will benefit secure system architecture and functionality in its future development. So the 
necessity of analyzing and designing new methodologies or investigating into the extensions of existing 
tools for modelling security in business processes remains actual and motivating.  
1.2 Research questions and contribution   
In current thesis we raise the importance of two research questions: 
RQ1: What extensions should be implemented into the modelling language in order to express 
security concerns?   
We investigate the opportunity to address security in organizational business processes using the 
Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN, version 2.0), a multi-vendor standard controlled by 
Object Management Group (White, 2004). In our previous work (Altuhhova et al., 2012) we performed 
an alignment between BPMN constructs and Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) 
(Dubois et al., 2010) domain concepts. Our purpose was to define the volume of security related 
concepts that can be covered by current version of language. This research resulted into the alignment 
table that shows the following: security concepts can be addressed by existing BPMN semantics and 
syntax only partially; another part of ISSRM domain remains uncovered. So in this study we continue 
our research and develop the set of extensions on semantics concrete and abstract syntax. We 
demonstrate how to apply extensions on running example of the Internet Store, including risk scenarios 
for three security criteria: confidentiality, integrity and availability. We then validate our study in the 
form of experiment and analyse the understandability of proposed extensions. We believe that the 
following proposal will allow system analysts to model and analyse the business processes and security 
concerns at early stages of IS development with a help of one language. 
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RQ2: How to transform security concerns between different modelling perspectives? 
In frames of this research question we demonstrate our contribution in a broader sense. For instance, 
in some cases application of the BPMN security extensions would not be applicable because of the 
language nature to model organization’s business processes, which means leading to the weak 
expressive power to address security concerns. This results into model transformation from BPMN to 
another modelling language. As an input we take an extended version of BPMN (that we also call Risk-
aware BPMN), which is described at the first stage of our research, and a goal-oriented modelling 
approach Secure Tropos, introduced in (Matulevičius et al., 2012). Secure Tropos supports the 
development of IS on early and late requirements analysis stages that give us an opportunity to see the 
business case from completely different side, concentrating on major system goals, actors and 
dependencies between them. We develop a set of transformation rules, created addressing the ISSRM 
domain coverage for both of the languages. The applicability of the rules is demonstrated on step by step 
transformation of confidentiality example from BPMN to Secure Tropos. To validate the transformation, 
we recreate the original Secure Tropos diagram from the example context and compare it with the 
resulted one. The validation is based on semantic completeness and correctness of two models sets. The 
goal of the validation is to find out, if transformed model provides sufficient coverage of security related 
concepts, or in other words will the transformed model have the solid informational background that can 
be understood by security or business analysts.  
1.3 Scope 
In current thesis we continue the research on security definition of business process modelling, and 
as it was defined previously (Altuhhova et al., 2012), we concentrate on BPMN 2.0 descriptive 
modelling level, analytical and executing modelling are out of scope (White., 2004). We demonstrate 
the applicability of developed extensions on the running example of Internet Store regarding to the 
integrity, confidentiality and availability of its valuable assets. Although the example is realistic, we are 
not attempting to apply it on the practice. The development or investigation of a practical tool for model 
transformation also remains out of scope. 
1.4 Structure 
The thesis is structured into three bigger parts: the Background, Contribution and Validation. The 
first part gives an overview on different techniques for security risk management, like CORAS, 
Automated Risk and Utility Management (known as AURUM), Goal-Risk Driven Assessment and 
Information Security Risk Management (ISSRM). We make a discussion and justify the choice of 
ISRRM for our research. Chapter 3 is dedicated to Business Process modelling and modelling 
approaches. Similarly to Security Engineering chapter structure we first make an overview of some 
modelling languages, such as UML Activity Diagrams, Yet Another Workflow Language (YAWL), 
Event-driven Process Chain, or EPC, and Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN), and explicate 
the idea for choosing BPMN. The last chapter in this part gives an overview on our previous study and 
related studies on BPMN applicability to express security. The second part, or Contribution, presents our 
investment regarding two research questions defined above. In Chapter 5 we propose the extensions to 
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BPMN approach and Chapter 6 in turn presents our attempt for model transformation from BPMN to 
Secure Tropos. The last part represents our validation to both steps of the study, including the language 
extensions and model transformation.  In Chapter 7 and 8 we describe the experiment that was held to 
assess the understandability of the language extensions and give and give a discussion of quality of 
transformation. In Chapter 9 we provide our conclusions, including limitations of the study and future 
perspectives. 
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CHAPTER 2. Security Engineering 
“Security Engineering is concerned with lowering the risk of intentional unauthorized harm to 
valuable assets to level that is acceptable to the system’s stakeholders by preventing and reacting to 
malicious harm, misuse, threats and security risks.” (Firesmith, 2003) 
The discipline of security engineering concentrates on tools, processes and methodologies that 
support analysing, designing and implementing new systems or adjusting existing system according to 
needs of its environment. The analysis of security should be performed through the whole software 
development process, starting from early requirements and going through design and implementation 
phases. An early consideration of security allows analysts and modellers to discover threats, its 
consequence and to develop different countermeasures. It also proposes sufficient security level design 
alternatives and even supports the decision for project abrogation in case if the risk is too high.  
Security modelling is an important aspect of Security Engineering. It allows analysing the system 
security on early stages of its development, defining roles, permissions and valuable artefacts of the 
system, capturing the software or network architecture, the system trust boundaries and defining security 
policy. There exist different tools and languages to help modellers proposing suitable security solutions. 
2.1 Security Risk Management 
Security Risk Management is an analytical procedure that helps to identify system valuable assets, 
stakeholders and operations, as well as risk levels of undesirable events; provides logics and guidance to 
find and implement appropriate solutions for specific situations and mitigation strategies; offers 
measures, defined in order to lower the risk level and reduce the likelihood of undesired events. In 
purposes to perform security risk management, many different methodologies were developed. In this 
chapter we make a short overview of four security risk management methodologies, such as CORAS, 
AURUM, Goal-Risk driven assessment and ISSRM. We also provide a detailed view on Information 
System Security Risk Management approach and motivate the choice of selected methodology for the 
current research. The choice is based on comparison of above mentioned security risk management 
methodologies with respect to their domain, process, modelling languages being provided and means for 
estimation. The comparison and conclusions can be found in the end of running Chapter.  
2.1.1 CORAS 
The CORAS offers three artefacts, such as a method for asset-driven risk analysis, language and a 
tool. CORAS is a model-driven approach (Braber et al., 2007), which includes a systematic guidance for 
security risk analysis. The CORAS method doesn’t provide only an overview on how two fulfil the 
objectives, but also on how to apply different analysis techniques. The CORAS language, based on 
UML profile, proposes means for documentation, analysis and representation of security risks. It offers 
five kinds of diagrams for particular stages of risk analysis. The presentation and of risk analysis results 
can be realized by the CORAS tool, which is a graphical editor, supporting the CORAS language. 
The guidelines for CORAS method consist of eight steps, starting from preparations for the analysis 
and finalized with risk treatment using treatment diagrams (Lund et al., 2010). Each step is divided into 
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subtasks with concrete objectives. First step is dedicated to initial preparations for the risk analysis. It 
includes setting the scope and objectives as well as informing the customer of its responsibilities. At step 
2 the introductory meeting is organized in order to collect useful information from the customer’s 
discussion. It is important to know what assumptions that can be made, and what scope of overall 
analysis we are dealing with. The purpose of the next step is to present the targets from the analyst view; 
he identifies system valuable assets and performs a high-level analysis. It is a right time for corrections 
and clarifications of some issues and misunderstandings. Step 4 is focused on agreement on the target to 
be analysed; it includes scope, assumptions. Important aspect here is to agree on scales for consequences 
and likelihood. It is only finished when documentation is prepared by analyst and confirmed by 
customer. The objective of step 5 is to identify all the possibilities of threats, vulnerabilities and threat 
scenarios. For this purposes the structured brainstorming is used. All the findings are documented in 
CORAS threat diagram. Properly composed threat diagrams are then used to estimate likelihoods and 
consequences at Step 6. It is required to compute the risk values in order to decide if the risks are 
acceptable or should be treated in future. Step 7 concentrates on giving the first risk picture, including 
determination of what risks from identified must be considered for treatment. The risk evaluation 
criterion is also defined at this step. The objective of Step 8 is to identify treatment and address cost-
benefits, before a final plan is composed.  
 
 
 
2.1.2 Automated Risk and Utility Management 
Automated Risk and Utility Management, AURUM, is a prototype that supports decision making 
according to organizational needs with respect to selection of security measures (Ekelhart et al., 2009). 
AURUM provides different modules regarding the general information security domain. The AURUM-
Inventory module supports the system characterization phase, performing network scanning and 
providing solutions. For the threat determination AURUM uses Bayesian-network, a probabilistic 
graphical model that shows variables and their conditional dependencies. Having access to security 
Figure 1. Eight steps of CORAS method guidance; adapted from (Lund et al., 2010) 
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ontology and AURUM-Bayes module, AURUM-Risk module calculates the risk levels for different 
organizational assets.  
The first step of methodology concentrates on defining the system boundaries. It takes into account 
document reviews, interviews and questionnaires. From the beginning AURUM guides user by 
inventory process and ensures formally correct infrastructure model. Moreover, it offers a 
comprehensive resource classification and allows defining new concepts in used classification. With 
clear resource definitions AURUM provides consistency in ontological model.  
Step two is dedicated to threat identification. It is important to define potential threats and its 
possible sources; natural threats, human threats, environmental threats. The report on potential threats is 
produced and used as an input for a next phase, which stands for vulnerability identification.  
The main objective of step three is to consider possible vulnerabilities in the field of management 
security, operational security and technical security. A mitigation control is created for each of defined 
vulnerabilities, the fact that the control is implemented means that vulnerability can be closed. 
Next step of AURUM methodology involves control analysis. It gives an overview on what controls 
will mitigate the likelihood of a threat. AURUM uses the data collected at the system characterization 
stage and is able to conduct analysis of controls automatically. 
In order to define the likelihood of a threat exploiting certain vulnerability within the system 
boundary, it is required to take into account the following aspects; the capability of threat resource, the 
origin of the vulnerability and effectiveness of existing controls. The Bayesian networks are used to 
determine the likelihood in specific organization. 
Step 6 refers to impact analysis. It is necessary to understand the risk level and for the basis for 
suggestion the controls to implement. AURUM proposes automatic support to determine the impact of 
threats, using develop knowledge base.  
The final step is dedicated to risk determination.  At this step the risk is calculated by multiplying 
the values assigned to risk likelihood and ratings of impact.  
After the overall risk was calculated, the list of control recommendations can be proposed. AURUM 
focuses on the selection of controls for all objectives. This ability is very important on the level of 
efficiency for the organization. Moreover, AURUM provides decision makers with intuitive interface 
that helps to find specific salvation for a problem. The methodology is based on modifications of lower 
and upper bounds for selected objective. 
2.1.3 Goal-Risk driven assessment 
The Goal-Risk driven assessment is another methodology in software engineering to manage 
security risks. In order to operate the concepts of goal, task and resource Goal-risk driven assessment 
uses Tropos software methodology. The conceptual representation of Goal-Risk model introduces three 
layers: asset, event and treatment layer (Asnar et al., 2011). It allows modelling and analyzing the 
organizational settings from early requirements to implementation. In purposes of introduction the 
specific concepts and relationships for risk analysis, Tropos goal modelling framework was extended. 
Conceptual representation of model includes three layers: one to introduce assets, another for events and 
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the last one for treatments. Mathematically, GR model is depicted as a set of nodes, having relations 
among them including special impact relation. 
The asset layer introduces system valuable assets and strategic interests of stakeholders, the inter-
relations between them, basing its graphical representation on Tropos goal model. The creation of a 
model starts with identification of top goals of system stakeholders. Each goal is then refined with AND- 
or OR-decomposition into sub-goals. The following decompositions allow branching the ways to fulfil 
the goal, providing alternatives. Next step is to create the relationships between goals. With the help of 
these relations, the interrelations between the asset layer and other layers can be also added.   
The event layer characterizes events, concentrating on two properties: likelihood and severity. In the 
model, likelihood is defined as a property of an event and can hold the qualitative values like likely, 
occasional, rare or unlikely. Severity is modelled as a sign of an impact relation. Severity can be the 
following: strong positive, positive, negative or strong negative. Such view allows modelling the 
situation when impact has an influence on more than one goal. The creation of event layer starts with 
identification of events; it can be performed with different approaches. When it is done, events are 
decomposed into sub-events following the similar relations as in the asset layer. Dependency among 
events can be modelled with the use of contribution relations.  
The treatment layer focuses on risk treatment, mitigation and countermeasures. The analysis of 
treatment layer can be realized with decomposition and contribution relations, similarly to assets and 
events. There are two variants of how the treatment impacts on the risk: it can reduce its likelihood or 
smooth its severity. Treatment methods are divided into following categories: removal or avoidance, 
prevention, attenuation and retention. The choice of how to elicit treatment depends on how it mitigate 
the risk on event layer. 
Although, no process basing on step by step guidance is proposed by the Goal-risk driven 
assessment methodology, all the concepts and relations are structured in Meta-model. The model 
introduces the basic structures, such as: goals, tasks, resources and events, as well as relations between 
them: decomposition, contribution alleviation, means-end, needed-by. Impact is considered as a special 
relation because of the purposes of its use.   
Current methodology also includes the risk assessment process. The latter consists of three steps: to 
find any alternative solutions, to measure the alternatives and evaluate them against relevant risks and 
finally, to assess the countermeasures in order to mitigate risks. 
2.1.4 Information System Security Risk Management 
Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) is practitioner-oriented methodological tool 
that helps organizations make decisions related to the security of Information Systems (Mayer, 2009; 
Dubois et al., 2010). The ISSRM application follows the general risk management process consisting of 
six steps. It starts with organizational context and assets identification. Then the determination of 
security objectives is performed. Basing on the required protection level for valuable assets, we turn to 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. The next step is dedicated to risk analysis and assessment, 
helping identification of potential risky scenarios and impacts they lead to. When the risk assessment is 
performed, it is time to take the risk treatment decision. The latter will result into security requirements 
definition, which in turn will be implemented into security controls. The important artefact of ISSRM 
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application is a domain model that introduces three groups of concepts; assets-related, risk related and 
risk treatment-related. 
 Assets-related concepts describe organisation’s assets and their security criteria. Here, an asset is 
anything that is valuable and plays a vital role to accomplish organisation’s objectives. A business asset 
describes the information, processes, capabilities and skills essential to the business and its core mission. 
An IS asset is the IS component, valuable to the organisation since it supports business assets. A security 
criterion is the property or constraint on business assets describing their security needs, which are, 
typically, expressed through confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
 
Figure 2. The ISSRM Domain Model; adapted from (Dubois et al., 2010) 
Risk-related concepts introduce a risk definition. A risk is composed of a threat with one or more 
vulnerabilities that leads to a negative impact on one or more assets by harming them. An impact is the 
consequences of an event that negates the security criterion defined for business assets in order to harm 
assets. An event is an aggregation of threat and one or more vulnerabilities. A vulnerability is the 
characteristics of IS assets that expose weakness or flaw. A threat is an incident initiated by a threat 
agent using attack method to target one or more IS assets by exploiting their vulnerabilities. A threat 
agent is an agent who has means to harm intentionally IS assets. An attack method is a standard means 
by which a threat agent executes threat. 
Risk-treatment related concepts describe the concepts to treat risk. A risk treatment is a decision 
(e.g., avoidance, reduction, retention, or transfer) to treat the identified risk. A security requirement is 
the refinement of a risk treatment decision to mitigate the risks. A control designates a means to improve 
the security by implementing the security requirements. 
2.2 Comparison of Security Risk Management Methodologies 
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In order to compare different methodologies of security risk management we involve four criteria. 
The definition of domain stands for existence of Domain or Meta model that represents all the concept 
or groups of concepts that methodology uses, as well as relations between them. It can be realized with 
the help of class diagrams, like in case with ISSRM and Goal-Risk driven assessment. The next criterion 
called process describes the defined guidelines to perform security risk management step by step. The 
methodology can provide the concrete process or give the general guidance on how to apply the 
methodology to different situations. As well as a process, Security Risk Management methodology can 
provide the language developed in direct purposes of it. It can propose new and absolutely unique 
language as well as extend or use existing modelling languages. The last criterion is estimation. It stands 
for ability to provide any means, rules or values to estimate risks, impacts or cost-benefits. 
The table below (see Table 1) gives an overview on how different methodologies cover these four 
aspects that we defined earlier. We can notice that the Domain model is provided by Goal-risk driven 
assessment methodology (Asnar et al., 2010) and ISSRM (Dubois et al., 2010). Both define basic 
concepts and relations with the help of Class diagram. The guiding process is introduced precisely in 
CORAS, AURUM and ISSRM. Goal-Risk driven assessment concentrates on general representation of 
three levels conceptual model representation; it defines the major purposes of each level. Considering 
the next criterion, the existence of applicable modelling language, CORAS introduces its own, 
specialized diagrammatic language for risk modelling. For graphical representation AURUM uses 
Bayesian networks, a probabilistic graphical model that represents variables and dependencies. In its 
turn Goal-risk driven assessment presents the Tropos extension. The language was extended with the 
purposes to present specific concepts, such as impact, likelihood, and severity. ISSRM propose an 
opportunity to choose the language to model with, it can be Secure Tropos (Matulevičius et al., 2008b), 
Misuse Cases (R. Matulevičius et al., 2008a) or some of other possibilities. With respect to estimation it 
can be said that CORAS process involves a step which dedicated to risk treatment and also addresses the 
cost-benefits. AURUM defines the estimation of risk by multiplying the values assigned to risk 
likelihood and ratings of impact. Considering the Goal-risk framework methodology, it Methodology 
includes the risk assessment process, consisting of three steps. ISSRM provides metrics for the risk level 
evaluation, threat likelihood and the potentiality of events, as well as cost benefits for risk treatment 
module (Mayer, 2009). 
2.3 Why ISSRM? 
ISSRM provides a domain model which presents concepts of three major groups: asset-related 
concepts, risk-related concepts and risk treatment-related concepts (Mayer, 2009). These concepts and 
relationships between them are presented in a form of UML class diagram. Precise definitions of 
concepts are given in documentation. The domain model of the methodological glossary helps to 
understand the scope of ISSRM. ISSRM follows the general risk management process, which consists of 
six steps, including the definition of organizational context, determination of security objectives, risk 
analysis and assessment, taking the risk treatment decision, defining the security requirements and 
finally the implementation of security controls. The process is iterative and should be followed as many 
times as it necessary to reach the acceptable level of risks. Although ISSRM doesn’t define the concrete 
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language to be applied during the process, it can be confronted with a number of security-oriented 
modelling languages such as Misuse-Cases, Mal-activity Diagrams, KAOS, Secure Tropos and others. 
Finally ISSRM introduces metrics for evaluating risk and impact levels, the likelihood of treat and 
potentiality of event. It also involves evaluating the security need for objectives and cost benefits for risk 
treatment, security requirements and controls. Business assets are estimated with respect to its value.  
 
Table 1. Artefacts provided by different risk management methodologies 
Criteria CORAS AURUM 
Goal-Risk driven 
assessment 
ISSRM 
Domain - - All the concepts and 
relations are 
structured in the 
Meta-model 
ISSRM Domain 
Model is divided into 
three groups of 
constructs related to 
assets, risks, risk 
treatment.  
Process Introduces eight-step 
process for risk 
management 
The process describes a 
guidance that covers six 
steps of risk 
management 
- Follows the general 
risk management 
process consisting of 
six steps 
Language CORAS language is 
customised, 
diagrammatic 
language for risk 
modelling 
Uses Bayesian-
network, a probabilistic 
graphical model that 
shows variables and 
their conditional 
dependencies 
Uses Tropos goal 
modelling framework 
extended for the 
purposes of 
methodology. 
Doesn’t provide any 
concrete language, 
but it is applicable 
with Secure Tropos, 
Misuse Cases, Kaos 
or EPC 
Estimation  Defines treatment 
and addresses cost-
benefits 
Estimation assigned to 
risk likelihood and 
ratings of impact.  
The risk assessment 
process, consisting of 
3 steps 
Mainly concentrates 
on risk and impact 
levels as well as on 
likelihood of threat 
events 
2.4 Security risk-oriented modelling languages 
There exist a number of studies that are focusing on security risk management for IS requirements 
engineering, for example: Mal-activity Diagrams (Soomro and Ahmed, 2012), Misuse Cases 
(Chowdhury et al., 2012) and Secure Tropos (Matulevičius et al., 2012). In these studies modelling 
languages were aligned to ISSRM domain in purposes to understand how they deal with security. Each 
of these languages was then extended on semantic and syntactical levels. To investigate the possibility 
of transformation, which will be described in the following chapters, we have chosen one of security 
risk-oriented languages, Secure Tropos, which will be briefly introduced in the next section. 
2.4.1 Secure Tropos 
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Secure Tropos (Matulevičius et al., 2012) is an extension of Tropos (Bresciani et al., 2004), which 
allows modelling security sensitive scenarios involving identification of actors, goals and softgoals, 
plans, resources and believes as well as security constraints and threats on early stages of system 
development. Early requirement analysis benefits the better understanding of organizational setting. In 
comparison to BPMN Secure Tropos doesn’t cover the process flow, but focuses on security assets. It 
features security attack scenarios, highlighting security constraints and methods as well as business and 
IS assets, which are covered by protection mechanisms. The result of language alignment to ISSRM 
domain model can be found in Table 4, which demonstrates the part of security concepts covered by the 
language. 
Secure Tropos introduces the following set of constructs. An actor is defined as an entity that 
expresses any intensions or strategic aims within the organization or its setting. A goal (sometimes 
hardgoal) is a representative of actor’s strategic intensions or interests. A softgoal, unlike a goal, has a 
weak criterion to be decided whether it is satisfied or not, however it also represents the actor’s aims or 
interests. A plan introduces a way to achieve the desired goal(s). Any informational or physical entities 
of the system can be represented by resources. A belief expresses the actor’s knowledge of the world. 
The above mentioned concepts are introduced in both, Tropos and Secure Tropos, however the last 
introduces an additional set of concepts concerning security. A security criterion is a restriction in 
security that must be respected by organization and its actors. A threat is defined as circumstances that 
provoke the danger and loss for assets valuable to the system.  
The number of models involved in the process of information system development and supported by 
Secure Tropos. The security enhanced actor model (SEAM) introduces actors, environment and 
dependency relationships between the components. The security enhanced goal model (SEGM) helps 
understanding how the actor’s goals to be fulfilled, plans to be realized and availability of resources to 
be obtained. A security reference diagram covers the identification of security requirements. 
To consider the models complete, different relations between the constructs of Secure Tropos should 
be introduced. A dependency relationship indicates who from the actors are depender, dependum and 
dependee. Dependency may be given between several actors. Secure dependencies establish security 
constraints, which have to be respected by actors and implemented by the dependee. Decomposition is 
used for decomposing abstract entities into more specific components.  Means-ends in turn link a plan, 
resource or goal (mean) with a goal (end). Contribution describes a positive (+) or negative (–) impact 
one mean (e.g. plan, resource, goal) has on another.  Restricts is a relationship that indicates which 
security constraint is applied on a certain asset. Attack relationship identifies the target of an attacker’s 
plan.  
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Table 2. Secure Tropos and ISSRM alignment 
 
ISSRM concepts 
(R – relationship; C - concept) 
Constructs of Secure Tropos 
Assets C 1) Actor, Hardgoal, Plan, Resource, Softgoal, Secure Goal 
2) Composition of the constructs (1) using dependency, means-
ends, contribution and decomposition relationships 
Business asset C 
IS asset C 
Supports R Relationships: dependency, means-ends, contribution and 
decomposition 
Constraint of R Implicitly: In the Secure Dependency link Security constraint restricts 
(is a constraint of) a dependum 
Explicitly: Restricts link between Security constraint and Plan, 
Resource, and Hardgoal 
Security objective C  
Security criterion C Softgoal, Security Constraint (incl. decomposition), Contribution 
Characteristics of C - 
Vulnerability C not officially covered, but extension vulnerability point may be added 
to Plan, Hardgoal or Resource 
Attack method C Plan 
Impact/negates/harms R/C Impacts-relationship 
Targets/Leads to 
(leads to a harm of IS 
assets) 
R - 
Leads to 
(leads to a harm of 
Business assets) 
R - 
Threat agent C Agent 
Uses R Agent executes plan 
Threat  C Goal, Plan 
Event C 1) Composition of an Agent, Hardgoal, Plan and Vulnerability 
points (incl. target- and exploits-relationships) 
2) Threat 
Risk C Composition of Threat and Impacts-relationship 
Significance assessed by R - 
Provokes R - 
Decision to threat R - 
Leads to R - 
Implements R - 
Controls C 1) Actor, Hardgoal, Plan, Resource, Softgoal, Security Constraints 
2) Components constructed when combining constructs (1) using 
dependency, means-ends, contribution and decomposition 
relationships, mitigates-relationship 
Security requirements 
and mitigates 
C/R 
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CHAPTER 3. Business Process Modelling 
Business process management enables to define, implement, improve and analyze the interactional 
flow within the organization correspondingly to its’ goals and needs of its stakeholders. More specific it 
deals with interactions between people, working in the organization, parts of a system (i.e. applications, 
databases) or external communicating parties (i.e. business partners). In other words, it guides managing 
the organizational business processes. The approach on BPM implementation generally includes three 
basic steps. It starts with research, directed on the identification of business tasks involved into the 
process and the set of associating business rules. Resulted into the visual model, the business process 
now gives an overview of process flow and its participants. Step two: analytics continue the research, 
filling the model with information on process’ external participants, their communication and exchange 
of recourses. In addition the model is updated with error and exception paths and requires finding the 
best way of handling. And finally, at the step three, model is implemented. It is then provided with 
additional business logic to perform the process functionality and tested to find out if something needs to 
be improved or changed. 
The modelling aspect is an important part of the management process and in IS development. At the 
different stages of business process management models are the inputs and outcomes, so it considered 
being a valuable artefact in analysis. The visualization via modelling allows seeing the business process 
in details for its better understanding; it helps specify standard and optimised workflows of organisation. 
In addition, the graphical model opens an opportunity for marking the exceptional flows that leads to 
better error and exception handling.  
3.1 Approaches to do BPM 
We have chosen three more modelling languages in order to compare them between each other and 
to explain the choice of BPMN for analysis performed in this paper. The languages we involve into 
comparison are the UML Activity Diagrams, Yet Another Workflow Language (YAWL) and Event-
driven Process Chain (EPC). The overview of all the languages, its major semantic aspects and simple 
examples are presented below. Conclusions of comparison and criteria can be found in last paragraph of 
this chapter. 
3.1.1 UML Activity Diagrams  
The tool that is frequently used for business process modelling is UML activity diagrams. The 
standardized general-purpose modelling language, UML, uses activity diagrams to model the workflow 
behind the system being designed (Börger et al., 2000). An activity diagram is a flowchart, which shows 
the flow of control between the sequential activities of a process. It is typically used for modelling the 
logic captured by a single use case or usage scenario or for modelling a detailed logic of a business rule.  
The process depicted in activity diagram begins with initial node that symbolizes the default starting 
place and can be only one for the whole diagram. Action node represents an atomic action of the process 
flow. Activity nodes compose a flow of control in association with other activities and action states. 
Paths from one action or activity to another are represented with the help of so called transitions. 
Optionally, transition can be labelled by event or guard. The branching is also involved in UML activity 
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diagrams; it is realized with branch nodes that generally specify any alternative paths of a process flow. 
Fork and Join bars are used to split a single flow in two parallel control flows of the process. UML with 
it precise semantics allows depicting system dynamic behaviour and giving the opportunity to see the 
functionality of each system component.  
The applied technique of building the UML activity diagram is 
demonstrated in example of order fulfilment process (see Figure 4). 
Let’s imagine we have a system that receives an order for some good. 
The process of order fulfilment starts with initial node leading to the 
first activity Receive order. The process flow is split basing on a 
decision if the order is approved (can be fulfilled) or not; activity Fill 
order continues the process flow in case if the order is approved. If the 
order cannot be fulfilled for some reasons it will be denied. The 
normal flow then is continued with activities Send a bill and Ship order 
that are performed in parallel. The following is realized with fork and 
join. After the order is fulfilled, the process flow leads to activity Close 
order. The same is performed if the order is denied, but missing the 
preceding part of a process. And finally activity flow is ended with the 
end node. Figure 3 introduces basic shapes of UML activity diagrams. 
 
 
 
3.1.2 Yet Another Workflow Language 
Another representative of the business process modelling tools is YAWL, Yet Another Workflow 
Language, which is java-based open-source workflow system (Aalst et al., 2005). Funded on a concise 
Petri nets, YAWL is able to support complex data, integration with organizational resources and external 
applications, process verification and process configuration.  
YAWL has a formal semantics that benefit using it among other representatives of workflow 
modelling languages. A workflow specification in YAWL is formed with a set of so called EWF-nets, 
extended workflow nets. It has a hierarchical, tree-like structure, defined by atomic or composite tasks. 
Figure 4. UML Activity Diagram: 
Order fulfilment process 
Figure 3. UML semantics 
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Each lower level of hierarchy is formed by a composite task of an ETF-net, which in turn contains tasks, 
atomic or composite, and conditions. Normally, each net has one input condition as well as one output 
condition. Tasks can have multiple instances that allow optioning: upper and lower bound should be 
identified, once the task is initiated.   
In addition, YAWL has open interfaces based on Web standards that enable to plug-in existing 
applications and to extend the system. It also provides a graphical editor with built-in verification 
functionality that helps to detect errors automatically on early stages.  
Figure 5 is a simple example of YAWL net that represents a process of order fulfilment. It has 
Initial input as a start element, which is followed by OR-split task Receive order, that points put the place 
of decision making basing on conditions. Condition Approved leads the process flow to next task Fill 
order. In case if order is not approved (Condition not approved), it is then cancelled. AND-split task Fill 
order slices the flow into two parallel actions; atomic tasks Send a bill and Receive payment, and the task 
Ship order. The flows are then united again into one with the help of an AND-join task and leaded to the 
OR-join task Close order. The output condition is the one that end the process flow in YAWL. Basic 
YAWL graphical objects are represented in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5. YAWL: order fulfilment process 
Figure 6. YAWL semantics 
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3.1.3 Event-driven Process Chain 
An Event-driven Process Chain (EPC) is a type of flowchart that is used for business process 
improvement and also for laying out business process work flows, originally in conjunction with SAP 
R/3 modelling (Seel et al., 2005). The EPC is a base of the ARIS-framework and combines the different 
views towards the description of information systems in the control view on the conceptual level. EPC-
models are created in order to plan, simulate and control the processes of private enterprise.  
Processes, presented in models describe the use of functions and events as time-referring state 
changes. The process contains events and functions that describe passive states of activities. Functions 
and events are linked together with control flow. EPC model opens an opportunity to split and join the 
control flow; it is realized with the OR-, XOR- and AND-operators. In addition, control flow allows 
connecting two EPCs from different models together. Another important aspect of EPC modelling 
language is existence of resources that can be annotated to functions. The annotation describe the type of 
relation resource has to some function. Resources can be also annotated to other resources; the following 
is defined with relationship “resource structure”. 
The EPC model depicted in Figure 8 describes the simple order 
fulfilment process. The process flow starts with event Receive order. It is 
then followed by an EPC function Check order for approval. XOR-
operator is used to split the flow into two paths guided by different 
decisions; if the order is approved it is then being filled (Function Fill 
order), otherwise the order is cancelled. Another type of operator, used in 
this example is AND-operator that unites the sets of functions performed 
in parallel (e.g. Ship order and Send a bill). After the payment is received 
and order is shipped, the order then can be closed; the function Close 
order is preceded by an OR-operator that specifies that the order is closed 
either in terms if it is filled or cancelled. Both paths lead to event Order 
closed, which ends the process flow. Figure 7 gives an overview of basic 
EPC shapes used in the model. 
       
  
Figure 8. EPC example: 
Order fulfilment 
Figure 7. EPC semantics 
21 
 
3.1.4 Business Process Model and Notation 
Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) is a language for constructing business process 
models (Remco et al., 2007; Silver, 2009) It considered being business-friendly, because it is based on 
notions familiar from traditional flowcharting. At the same time, the notations are linked to a semantic 
model, which means that each shape used in the notation has a specific meaning, with defined rules and 
connections between objects. The key element of BPMN application is the Business Process Diagram. It 
is constructed of a set of graphical elements that were chosen to be distinguishable from each other and 
to utilize shapes that are familiar to most modellers. It describes a typical order of activities and what 
role or organizational unit performs or is responsible for the process.  
The graphical objects of language are divided into four major groups, which are flow objects, 
containers, artefacts and flows. The business process diagram usually starts and ends with events; it can 
be triggered or not. In some cases Intermediate events can be used to end the some parts of the process, 
not the main process. The atomic activities of the process are represented by Tasks. Tasks and different 
types of gateways compose the process flow; it can be guided by decisions with the help of XOR-
gateways or split into parallels by Parallel-Gateway. BPMN also allows involving system artefacts such 
as Data object and Data Store, and realise the communication between process participants, represented 
by Pools (Lanes in some cases), using the message flow.  
Figure 8 represents the business process of order fulfilment. Process starts with event (non-triggered 
start event) and the task Receive order. The XOR-gateway then splits the flow into two; if the order 
cannot be approved the task Cancel order is performed, otherwise flow is continued with task Fill order 
and parallel activities Send a bill and Ship order. When the payment is received and order is shipped, task 
Close order can be performed. The same happens if the order was cancelled for some reasons. The 
process is completed and ended by default with End event. The legend of element used to build the 
BPMN order fulfilment process is presented in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 10. BPMN semantics 
Figure 9. BPMN example: Order fulfilment process 
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3.2 Comparison of the Languages 
In this paragraph we introduce the reasons why we choose BPMN among other modelling 
languages. We compare BPMN with UML Activity Diagrams (Börger et al., 2000), EPC (Seel et al., 
2005)  and YAWL (Aalst et al., 2005). The criteria we decided to focus on is the expressive capacity of 
the language. We define it as an ability of the language to present as many semantic and syntactic 
aspects as it is possible. In current context term can be also described as a richness of language 
semantics to express different issues involved in business process; first of all, the process participants or 
stakeholders, their capabilities and skills. If we speak about business stakeholders, we should also pay 
attention to availability of communication between process participants. Then, we deal with data and 
information involved into the business process. The next important issue is the existence of resources 
that could be shared between process participants or just travel within the process flow. And finally, we 
examine the ability of the languages to describe processes, decisions and states (events). We analyse the 
expressive capacity of each language by defining the number of graphical objects that present one or 
another business issue. The more details, with respect to above mentioned, language is able to express 
the higher expressive capacity it has. The table below provides an overview on criteria and 
corresponding graphical objects in BPMN, EPC, YAWL and UML Activity Diagrams. 
 
Table 3. Ability of the languages to express different business issues 
Business issues BPMN EPC YAWL 
UML Activity 
Diagrams 
Stakeholders Pool, 
 Lane 
Organization unit - Swimlane 
Capabilities and skills Tasks (types User, Manual, 
Service) 
Function,  
Organization Unit 
Assignment 
Atomic task,  
Composite task 
Activity 
Communication Data (Message) flow, 
Event (message- or signal-
triggered) 
Data Association flow 
Information flow - - 
Data and information Data Object,  
Data association flow 
Information 
Resource, 
Information flow 
- - 
Resources Data Object,  
Data Store 
Information Resource - - 
Process Sub-process,  
Parallel Gateway,  
Or-Gateway,  
Sequence flow 
And operator,  
OR-operator,  
Path,  
Control flow 
And-split and join, OR-
split and join 
Fork,  
Join,  
Control flow 
Decisions (Conditions) XOR-Gateway XOR-operator XOR-split and join,  
Condition 
Branch, 
 Merge 
Events (States) Start Event,  
End Event,  
Intermediate Event. 
Event Input Condition, 
Output Condition 
Start,  
End 
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Stakeholder is defined as a person, group, and organizational unit, part of a system or any other 
participant of business process that can be affected by organizational actions. BPMN supports 
representing system stakeholders with Pools, if we mean involving parties outside the organization, or 
Lanes, in case if stakeholders stand for different part of one system, e.g. workers of one organization. 
UML activity diagrams use Swimlanes for similar purposes. Each Swimlane defines external or internal 
participant of a process. EPC also has means to present system stakeholders; it is represented with a 
structure of Organizational Unit. It determines which person or organization within the structure is 
responsible for which Function. On the other hand, YAWL has no concrete structure to support business 
process stakeholders. 
Stakeholders’ capabilities and skills are the actions and activities performed by system stakeholders 
or tasks under their responsibility. BPMN provides opportunities to define capabilities trough Tasks and 
labels such as Manual, User, or Service tasks, making an accent not only on responsibilities but division 
of automatic and manual tasks. EPC realizes relations between stakeholders and its capabilities with the 
help of Functions and Organizational Unit Assignment that connects the stakeholder and the Function it 
is responsible for. In its turn YAWL uses Atomic and Composite Tasks to define capabilities of process 
participants. UML Activity Diagram represents skills and capabilities of stakeholders with different 
Activities defined in Swimlanes. 
Communication can be defined as an exchange of information, data, resources or different signals 
between process participants. BPMN supports the above mentioned issue by use of Events (e.g. 
message- or signal-triggered) and Message flow. Another way to depict the exchange of resources or 
data is to use Data Association Flow. It realizes the connection between Tasks and system resources. In 
case if two tasks are performed by different stakeholders and data is the outcome of one Task and the 
input of another, we can speak about communication. For similar purposes EPC uses Information Flow 
that creates communication and describes the exchange of Information Resource, which can be the 
outcome of one Function and the input for another. YAWL and UML Activity Diagrams provide no 
means for realizing the communication flow between process participants. 
Data, information and resources are the important artefacts in business process. These terms cover 
all the material and immaterial assets, such as documents, databases, servers, processes and other, 
depending on context. To express data and resources BPMN uses Data Object and Data Store. It allows 
to define data sources such as databases, and also to involve any kinds of data sets. Both elements are 
related to Tasks and connected to it with Data Association Flow. EPC defined an Information Resource 
and Information Flow to deal with data and resources. YAWL, as well as UML Activity Diagrams, 
doesn’t support any graphical representation of data, information or resources. 
Every business organization involves many different processes to achieve its goals. Process is a 
sequential flow of activities performed by system stakeholders that leads to some end state or result. 
BPMN allows creating Sub-processes, using Parallel Gateways to fork the flow into some synchronous 
flows, involving OR-Gateways to give a preference to one of the forked flows. Similar to BPMN such 
opportunities are available in YAWL, EPC and UML Activity Diagrams.  
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Decisions are involved in almost every business process, because it has to provide optioning in 
majority of cases. BPMN as well as other three languages provide branching of the process flow and 
allow making the choice what path to follow. It is realized with so called XOR-Gateways in BPMN. In 
EPC and UML Activity Diagrams it is allowed not only splitting but also merging two or more flows 
into one if it is required. 
It is also important to follow the states of business processes or to see results, end or intermediate, so 
that’s why it can be useful to involve process states or events. Usually the process flow can be started 
with Events or so called Conditions, as well as it can be closed with End Events. BPMN provide triggers, 
such as Message-, Signal-, Cancel- and others, to define the type of Event. Besides it uses not only Start 
and End Event, but also Intermediate Events that allow to overview the intermediate results of Sub-
processes. EPC uses Events as states of different stages of a business process. An Event shows what 
circumstances a Function works or which state a Function or process results in. 
3.3 Why BPMN? 
The choice of BPMN among other language is based on few aspects, mainly related to the fact that 
BPMN covers major part of business issues described above. First of all, It provides means to perform 
business communication, covering different issues; messaging (message-triggered events, message 
flow), the exchange of resources (data association flow), signals exchange (signal-triggered events). It 
allows involving such artefacts as Data Objects and Data Store to deal with various forms and volumes 
of data, which is very important in any type of business. Moreover, BPMN is able to define external 
participants of the process as well as internal ones. This property of the language broadens the view on 
process from the side of business relationships between participants or different organizations. Then, 
labelling and types are actively involved into the modelling; we can set tasks types dividing them into 
user, manual or system. And finally, BPMN defines the concepts of sub-process and intermediate event 
that allows making business process more granular and detailed. With all above mentioned we consider 
BPMN applicable for business process modelling in a way it is required by the research. 
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CHAPTER 4. BPMN and Security 
In this Chapter we make an overview of our previous contribution regarding the alignment of 
BPMN 2.0 to ISSRM domain. We also observe some studies related to both, business process modelling 
with BPMN and security. And finally we make a discussion on the similarities and differences between 
our research and related works performed in the similar direction. 
4.1 Previous work 
There were number of papers published in recent years with a purpose to introduce the importance 
of information security and security in business processes. As the current aspects of system security 
becomes actual and vital for different types of organizations in modern technological world, in this 
Chapter we will observe the major findings with a focus to BPMN, considerations of security aspects in 
business processes and means of current modelling language to express these aspects. 
First of all, we would like to present the results of our previous work (Altuhhova et al., 2012), 
dedicated to definition of secure business processes. More specifically, in our research we applied a 
structured approach in order to understand the key aspects of BPMN and the way they can be used to 
express secure assets, risk and risk treatment with constructs of BPMN. We align the BPMN constructs 
with key concepts of ISSRM domain model to investigate into question of applicability of BPMN to 
model security. We test current means of the language on running example of Internet Store. We 
conduct the analysis creating a table, which presents and summarize our major findings. The concise 
version of a table is presented below (See Table 3). 
Thus the major contribution of this research is semantic alignment, we resulted into conclusions that 
BPMN does provide business analysts means for modelling security risks, but the graphical 
representation of these risks is limited with a sequence of different problems that can be grouped into 
three. First of all, it has to be noticed that the table is filled only partially, so the most common problem 
remains the absence of suitable constructs for ISSRM concepts. At this stage of analysis we could not 
define any constructs for Asset, Security criterion, Risk, Impact, Event, Vulnerability, Risk treatment and 
also for Control. Although none of these concepts found representation in BPMN concrete syntax, cases 
of Event and Vulnerability are different. The latter for example can be defined intuitively from the 
context of example and added to a textual annotation or description, the same way as Security criterion 
and Impact. Other aspects, such as Asset, Risk and Event remain undiscovered as well as missed in the 
BP Diagram. Moreover, in the Internet Store Example we deal with an overlapping semantics. The 
BPMN Task construct, for example, is used to express Business asset, Attack method and Security 
criterion, following situation leads to readability and comprehensibility problems. The same troubles are 
caused by use of Gateways, Flows and Events to express Security Risk Management aspects. Another 
problem is that some of the ISSRM concepts can be presented by several BPMN constructs. The 
following can be noticed for Business asset, IS asset, Threat, Attack method and Security requirement.  
We claim that in general BPMN approach is not specifically directed to model the security, but to 
perform the business process modelling, and nevertheless, it should not lose its original purpose. On the 
other hand, though, we came to conclusion that the major set of constructs that benefits understanding of 
valuable business assets, risks, related to them and potential security requirements are covered by 
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BPMN with its current state, so the language requires some reasonable extensions. The scope of this 
research doesn’t cover the determination of concrete extensions. However, we define some directions for 
potential and future research on that way. 
Table 4. The alignment of BPMN constructs to ISSRM concepts 
ISSRM Concepts BPMN Constructs 
A
ss
et
-r
el
a
te
d
 c
o
n
ce
p
ts
 Asset  
Business asset 
Data object;  
Task, Gateway, Event, Sequence flow 
IS asset 
Data store 
Pool, Lane 
Security criterion  
R
is
k
-r
el
a
te
d
 c
o
n
ce
p
ts
 
Risk  
Impact  
Event  
Threat A combination of constructs for Threat agent and Attack method 
Vulnerability  
Threat agent Pool 
Attack method 
Task; 
Flows (e.g., Data flow with the label describing attack method; 
Data association flow with the label describing attack method); 
R
is
k
 t
r
ea
tm
e
n
t-
r
e
la
te
d
 c
o
n
c
e
p
ts
 Risk treatment  
Security requirement 
Task, Gateway, Event,  
Sequence flow 
Control  
4.2 Related Studies 
Now we turn to other research papers that gained attention in the field of security in business 
process modelling. From the earlier researches, we should pay attention to the paper (Rodríguez et al, 
2007) that raises the question of BPMN extensions with respect to Security Requirements modelling. 
Basing on the Model-driven Architecture (MDA) approach, authors propose the extensions on BPMN 
that allow involving security requirements considerations into business process modelling. They 
concentrate on the perspective of business analyst to investigate the understanding of current aspect. The 
analysis performed in this paper proposes developed Business Process Diagram (BPD) metamodel, 
where the relationships between core elements of BPMN are defined and where from comes the 
motivation to extend the syntax, abstract and concrete. First of all, they introduce innovations with 
respect to abstract syntax by involving such security-related concepts as non-repudiation, attack harm 
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detection, integrity, privacy and others. Then the concrete syntax of BPMN was extended by adding 
marks or indications to the graphical element of BPMN. In addition, the symbol of padlock is introduced 
and labelled with a capital letters that stand for security requirements. Authors believe that the presented 
extensions will enable business analyst to express security requirements from their perspective, which 
will lead to a high level of details captured from the security needs of different stakeholders and benefits 
the understanding of common goals. 
In the next research (Menzel et al., 2009) authors direct the focus onto the BPMN enhancements 
towards trust modelling. They believe that multiple parameters have to be considered for sufficient 
security configurations. So they contribute to model-driven approach that enables annotating security 
intentions and ratings in business processes. More detailed, the metrics, described in the paper, allow 
giving a value to enterprise assets and concentrating on the level of security, the trust level for each 
participant in the process. The enterprise assets are presented using BPMN tasks, data objects, and 
communication links between tasks and participants. In addition, authors define how to enable 
trustworthy interactions, organisational trust, and security intensions through BPMN. Other proposed 
extension is a security policy model used to define specific security patterns for authorisation, 
authentication, integrity, and confidentiality.  
 Another paper (Mülle et al., 2011), which is motivated with the poverty of existing security 
vocabulary, concentrates on security constraints and security-specific user involvements. Authors 
contribute by integration of the security language, which supports above mentioned aspects, into BPMN 
2.0. Each security unit of the language is represented as a structured text annotation. Each annotation is 
tied to a particular set of BPMN elements, such as tasks, lanes, message flows or others. The fact that 
defined security constrains are placed in BPMN artefacts doesn’t create any contradictions at the syntax 
level. When transforming security constraints into the defined language, authors emphasize three more 
targets to observe: security policies, adjustment of the process flow, and parameter settings to apply 
security components. The components in turn create relations between users and tasks, apply security-
specific policies to the process and help managing the security issues. Moreover, such an investigation 
into extensions of the open-source business-process-management system (BPMS) allows transforming 
traditional business diagram filled with security constraints to executable process. 
Recently, in 2012, another paper has been explored. The research (Cherdantseva et al., Sept. 2012) 
contributes into definition of SecureBPMN, referring to the knowledge field of Information Assurance & 
Security (IAS). The latter covers the systematic management of Information Security countermeasures 
and is not limited with technical aspect of this question only; it also includes human-oriented aspects. 
The major contribution of this research is dedicated to consideration of IAS modelling capabilities in the 
focus for BPMN and to the perspective of developing the SecureBPMN, which will be the extended 
version of BPMN 2.0. The research method proposes to follow six steps on the way of development 
SecureBPMN. However, the scope of current paper doesn’t cover all the steps of defined research 
method. Authors start with representing of the alignment of the BPMN with IAS ontology and the Multi-
dimensional Model of IAS (MMIAS), which in turn was described in their previous research 
(Cherdantseva et al., Feb. 2012). As a result of this step, authors get an alignment table and make the 
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conclusion, that the security extensions for BPMN will not only use the existing elements of BPMN, but 
also require involving the new graphical elements to support effective security modelling.  
4.3 Discussion 
The main difference between our study and other researches (Rodríguez et al, 2007; Menzel et al., 
2009; Mülle et al., 2011) at the first stage of current analysis is that we present a semantically grounded 
fine-grained analysis based on the well-established ISSRM domain model. On the contrary, authors of 
above mentioned works either concentrate on small number of security aspects in business processes or 
focus their analysis on the coarse-grained level. For example Rodríguez et al in his study emphasizes on 
necessity to include security requirements into business process modelling. We, in turn, cover the bigger 
range of security aspects, following the ISSRM process: asset identification, security objectives, risk 
analysis, risk treatment and security requirements. Menzel et al (2009) investigates into trust modelling, 
targeting the trustworthy operations and organizational trust concepts. The research is limited with only 
focus on security goals; authors don’t consider any view on potential risks or its treatment. Mülle et al 
(2011) introduce the language that uses text annotations to present the security constraints and security-
specific user involvements. However, some security aspects are still not covered.  
Our previous work introduces the alignment between ISSRM concepts and the BPMN constructs, 
which allows analysts to understand current BPMN means to deal with security. We identify the 
horizons for potential BPMN extensions towards security. None of previously mentioned works provide 
a grounded analysis for proposed extensions or the reason why they target one or another security 
aspect. The conclusion of Cherdantseva et al. (2012) work points onto the necessity of extending the 
BPMN in terms of security modelling, which support our idea. In current work we go further and 
investigate into creation of such extensions at both, (concrete and abstract) syntax and the security risk-
oriented semantics levels of BPMN. We introduce the new constructs for the language as well as define 
the meanings for existing ones in order to improve the ability of BPMN to express security concepts. 
That makes our research different from those works that provide no extensions or cover the limited 
number of security aspects. Rodriguez et al propose the extensions for abstract and concrete syntax 
introducing the symbol of padlock and labels for BPMN existing elements. Menzel et al extend the 
group of BPMN artefacts by adding the concepts of Organizational trust and Security Group. Mülle et al 
use the text annotations tied to BPMN elements to introduce the language structures expressing security 
policies, adjustment of the process flow, and parameter settings to apply security components. 
Cherdantseva et al. (2012) investigate into SecureBPMN but doesn’t provide any extension at this stage.  
The overview shows that some of these works do not present sufficient base for demonstrating the 
necessity of extending the BPMN or target only few aspects of IS security, meanwhile, others do not 
propose any extensions. We believe that our previous work (Altuhhova et al., 2012) and the current 
research, together cover the reasons why and how BPMN needs to be extended to consider security in 
business process modelling in full value.   
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CHAPTER 5. Security Risk-oriented BPMN 
In this chapter we introduce our major findings in solving problems described above (see Chapter 
2). We provide extensions for the language, so that it can be used for purposes of modelling the security 
risks in business processes. At this stage of our research we propose the extensions on the BPMN 2.0 
concrete syntax, abstract syntax and semantics levels. 
5.1 Research Method 
The research method used in current thesis describes four steps. We start with consideration of the 
literature on the risk management standards (AS/NZS 4360, 2004; ISO/IEC Guide 73, 2002), security-
related standards (Common Criteria, 2005; Stoneburner et al., 2002), security risk management methods 
(Alberts and Dorofee, 2001; Braber et al., 2007) and software engineering frameworks (Firesmith, 2007; 
Haley et al.,2008). We then analysed how current version of BPMN 2.0 supports ISSRM (Meyer, 2009; 
Dubois et al., 2010). The process and the result of analysis were described earlier in previous 
contribution (Altuhhova et al., 2012). Then, basing on that research, we identified the possible points for 
extension. We do not just point out the aspects that need to be improved but propose the ideas of how to 
improve them. The third step of the research method is to present the extensions. At this stage we 
introduce the extensions of BPMN semantics, abstract and concrete syntax. The main goal of the final 
step remains to demonstrate extensions in work, so it includes the presentation of illustrative examples. 
First two steps were accomplished earlier (Altuhhova et al., 2012) and the performance of steps three 
and four is the objective of current thesis. 
5.2 Extensions on Concrete Syntax 
Although the need of language extension comes obviously from the results of our previous analysis 
(Altuhhova et al., 2012), we followed the idea of keeping syntax simple, clear and using-friendly in 
order to avoid the congestion of BP Diagrams. Starting with ISSRM Asset-related concepts (see Table 
1) we define the rules of expressing organization’s valuable assets with combination of Events, 
Gateways and Tasks using the Sequence flow. We label Tasks with letter ‘B’ for defining the Business 
asset, and letters ‘IS’ – for IS asset. Use of labels is absolutely optional; if the following division for 
assets is not important, it can be skipped. Moreover, in some cases Tasks can be classified as automated 
or manual, which requires putting another label. So in order to keep the picture clear, emphasizing of 
this kind of information is allowed to be ignored. Another way to express Business asset is to use Data 
Object. It covers the cases when we deal with some valuable material or immaterial information, such as 
papers, documents or records in the database. Business assets are supported by IS assets, the latter in 
turn are depictured with the help of Data Stores and Containers: Pools, Lanes or both. Support 
relationship is described as follows: Container supports combination of Flow Objects by containing 
them. Supports is also the Sequence flow between or Data Association Flow between elements that play 
roles of IS assets and Business assets. To express the Constraint of relation we involved the new 
construct - the symbol of a lock, which is used in a combination with Association Flow and textual 
Annotation. The letter inside the Lock describes the Security objective of a Business asset. The 
Annotation gives additional information on Security criterion. 
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At the next stage we introduce the possibility to mark language elements with different colours: 
asset-related concepts are presented as usual (normally – black lines, no fill), we use red to highlight the 
risk-related concepts and blue – to show the risk treatment-related concepts. Such division helps to see 
the difference between the same BPMN constructs aligned to different ISSRM concepts.  It also helps to 
avoid labelling methodology, which brings us to a risk of diagram overload with additional variables. 
Concentrating on ISSRM risk-related concepts, we open a new element which is a part of 
Characteristics of concept. In combination with Association Flow and Annotation, Vulnerability point is 
a property of constructs that describe IS assets, more concrete – Data Objects and Tasks. The 
vulnerability itself is described in the textual Annotation; red signals about the weakness of the system. 
When we speak about risks, we expect the existence of a Threat agent. If the attacker represents an 
independent unit, we use Pools to express this concept. In case if he is a part of a bigger system it can be 
represented by Lane, also coloured in red to differ from custom participants. The Attack method is a 
combination of Flow Objects and a Sequence Flow. It is built just the same way as a normal flow of a 
process, but using Tasks, Gateways and Events in red. It can be an independent process or a combination 
of constructs implemented into the normal flow of events, depending on what way the Threat Agent 
chooses to attack the system. Uses relationship is expressed with a Data Flow. This is usually the flow 
between Pool (Threat agent) and a Start Event of an attack process.  
The next new element we introduce is an Unlock, which is a property of constructs that describe 
Business assets and present an Impact, Harms and Negates relationships. It is depictured as an opened 
lock and holds a letter of broken security criterion inside, correspondingly to confidentiality, integrity or 
availability. The Impact leads to a harm of valuable assets. There are two ways to express Targets and 
Leads to relationships; it depends on what assets we are dealing with. If the talk is about a harm of IS 
assets, we use Sequence Flow from Flow Objects that represent the Attack method to Flow Objects of IS 
assets, or Data Association Flow from Task to Data Store. In case of Business assets - Sequence Flow 
from Flow Objects that represent the Attack method to Flow Object expressing Business assets, or Data 
Association Flow from Task to Data Object. Such complex concepts as Risk, Event and Threat are 
described in the context of ISSRM model as a compositions from early defined simplex concepts. For 
example Threat is appear to be the combination of a Threat agent and his Attack method, so it is 
depictured as a combination of constructs for these two concepts. Rest of the risk – related concepts is 
defined just the same way (for more details see Table 2).  
The idea of keeping the language simple and comprehensible influenced mostly on risk treatment-
related concepts (see Table 3). We defined Security Requirements and Mitigates relationship as a 
combination of Flow Objects using Sequence Flow and also specified the colour of elements, which is 
blue. The reason why we only concentrated on this aspect is a wish to accentuate the process of risk 
treatment. We emphasized on showing the integration of tasks and activities that would help to keep the 
process safe from the harmful attacks. There are still no constructs for Significance assessed by, 
Decision to threat, Controls and all the relationships. But we consider this information to be excessive 
and inessential for being depictured within the process on the diagram. However, it should be mentioned 
in a textual annotation, description to a model or in the report for the whole picture. 
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Table 3. Extensions on BPMN Concrete Syntax: Asset-related Concepts 
ISSRM 
concepts 
 
Constructs of BPMN 
 
Concrete syntax 
Assets Combination of Flow Objects 
(Event, Gateway, Tasks) using sequence flow. 
For Business assets  
For IS assets  
 
Business asset Data object 
 
IS asset Data store 
Containers  (Pool and Lanes) 
 
 
Supports Implicitly: 
Container (IS asset) supports combination of Flow Objects 
(Business assets) by containing them. 
 
Sequence flow between Flow Objects (IS assets) and Flow 
Objects (Business assets) 
 
Data Association Flow between Task (IS asset) and Data 
Object (Business asset) and between Data Store (IS asset)  
and Task (Business asset) 
 
Constraint of Lock and Association Flow that points from the Lock to an 
Annotation. 
Lock is a property of constructs that describe Business assets 
(Data Objects and Tasks) 
      
Security 
objective 
Is a property of a Lock that can have a value: 
c – confidentiality 
i – integrity 
a – availability  
Security 
criterion 
Annotation 
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Table 4. Extensions on BPMN Concrete Syntax: Risk-related Concepts 
ISSRM concepts 
 
Constructs of BPMN 
 
Concrete syntax 
Characteristics 
of 
Vulnerability point and Association Flow that points to 
Annotation. 
Vulnerability point is a property of constructs that describe IS 
assets, i.e. Data Object and Task 
 
    
Vulnerability Annotation 
 
Attack method Combination of Flow Objects (Event, Gateway, Task) using 
Sequence Flow 
 
Impact/negates/
harms 
Unlock 
Unlock is a property of constructs that describe the Business 
assets 
    
Targets 
Leads to 
(leads to a harm 
of IS assets) 
Sequence Flow from Flow Objects (Attack method) to Flow 
Objects (IS assets). 
Data Association Flow from Task (Attack method) to Data 
Store (IS asset). 
Sequence Flow and Data Association Flow both correspond to 
Targets and Leads to (in this case it leads to the harm of the IS 
assets). 
 
Leads to 
(leads to a harm 
of Business 
assets) 
Sequence Flow from Flow Objects (Attack method) to Flow 
Objects (Business assets). 
Data Association Flow from Task (Attack method) to Data 
Object (Business asset). 
Leads to a potential harm of the Business asset.  
Threat agent Pool and Lane 
(Containers) 
 
Uses Data Flow  
Threat  Combination of construct for Threat Agent and Attack 
method 
 
Event Combination of constructs for Threat and Vulnerability 
 
Risk Combination of Event and Impact 
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Table 5. Extensions on BPMN Concrete Syntax: Risk Treatment-related Concepts 
ISSRM 
concepts 
 
Constructs of BPMN 
 
Concrete syntax 
Significance 
assessed by 
No construct - 
Provokes No construct - 
Decision to 
threat 
No construct - 
Leads to No construct - 
Implements No construct - 
Controls No construct - 
Security 
requirements 
and Mitigates 
Combination of Flow Objects using Sequence Flow 
 
5.3 BPMN Meta-Model 
BPMN uses four major classes of constructs at the level of descriptive modelling: these are Flow 
Objects, Containers, Flows and Artefacts (see Figure 1). Flow Objects represent atomic units of a 
process with the help of Events, Tasks and Gateways. The start and the end of a process flow is 
indicated by the Event: it can be triggered or non-triggered. The Task describes any atomic activity 
performed in the process flow: sometimes it can also represent the collapsed sub-process. What concerns 
Gateways: it realise the control of the sequence flow: forks it basing on different decisions or helps to 
organize parallel activities. 
The role of object holders is performed by Containers, these are Pools and Lanes. Pools represent 
the participants of the process as independent units, showing the message flow between them. The Pool 
can contain some number of Lanes, each represent different parts of one working system: a performer 
role on organizational unit. 
 The BPMN Artefacts’ group is represented by Data Store, Data Object and Annotation.  Data 
Objects describe recourses that travel within the process flow: data can be produced by one activity and 
used as an input by another. To demonstrate how the data can be stored – we apply the construct of Data 
Store. Annotations give any additional textual information to the process or its components.  
To extend the language functionality we bring in two more individual classes – Vulnerability Point 
and Lock. Vulnerability Point is a property of a Task or a Data Store and points out the place of a system 
weakness. Lock is used to express the constraint of valuable business with respect to security criterions 
such as integrity, confidentiality and availability. Lock has a value attribute which indicates what we are 
dealing with: constraint is expressed with a lock symbol, the broken security criterion is depictured with 
an unlock sign. 
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Figure 11. BPMN Extended Abstract Syntax: Concept Classification 
Relationships between the Flow Objects are defined with the help of flows, including Sequence 
Flow, Data Flow and Data Association Flow (see Figure 2and Figure 3). To link together BPMN Tasks, 
Gateways and Events within the single Pool we use Sequence Flow. Data Flow shows the 
communication between Pools, which depict the input and the output of process resources. And finally 
Data Association Flow links together Tasks and Artefacts, Vulnerability Point and the text Annotation 
and also the Lock with an Annotation.   
 
Figure 12. BPMN Extended Abstract Syntax: Relationships 
37 
 
 
Figure 13. BPMN Extended Abstract Syntax: Relationships 
5.4 Examples 
In this Chapter we will introduce our running example modelled using extended BPMN. In order to 
investigate security risks in online Internet Store system, more detailed in message handling process, we 
will follow the ISSRM process (Meyer, 2009; Dubois et al., 2010). 
5.4.1 Confidentiality 
Context and asset identification. The process starts when potential User (Pool User in Figure 14) 
sends a message with a request to get the registration details to have right of using the Internet Store. 
After the message is sent, it is being accepted and registered by the system (Task Register received 
message). The administrator (Lane Administrator) accepts the message by opening it (Task Accept 
message), then he reads and writes the answer (Tasks Read message and Prepare answer). At the next 
step the answer with request to register on the webpage is being sent back to the user (Task Send out 
answer + message triggered End Event).  
Determination of security objectives. The part of the process takes place on the system software, 
which helps to organize activities for accepting and sending the message back. The system database is 
also placed on the server side, so the purpose is to ensure the confidentiality of the stored data, i.e. 
usernames and passwords. In case of the confidentiality is revealed by the Violator, he can use the data 
for unintended purposes. 
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Figure 14. Message Handling Process: Asset Identification 
Risk Analysis and assessment. Figure 15 represents a potential risky scenario. Let’s imagine that 
we have a third party this time, the violator (Pool Violator), who wants to skip the registration process 
and use the existing account data to enter the system. Just the same way as a custom user, the violator 
sends a message with request to the system administrator. But this time the spy malicious code is 
attached to the message (Message Flow Request for login and password (containing spy program)). As 
usually, the system registers the message, by keeping it on the server. Then administrator performs his 
usual activities. He opens the message, but this time the execution of the spy program starts in parallel. 
Just like in the normal flow, administrator goes on with reading the message and preparing the answer. 
Meanwhile, the malicious code initializes a new task; it extracts the data from the database (Task Extract 
username and password). By sending the inquiry to the database it gets the username and password of 
some existing user. The information then is attached to the answer message (Data Association Flow and 
Data Object Login and password), which is sent back to violator. We identified a number of weaknesses 
in the current system. First of all, registration of messaged is accomplished without any previous 
scanning (Vulnerability point + Annotation Message is handled without scanning). Moreover, the 
database control is not reliable; it can be accessed without proper rights (Vulnerability point + 
Annotation DB access is not controlled). And finally, the outgoing traffic control is not implemented, 
which leads to loss of valuable data (Vulnerability point + Annotation Outgoing traffic is not 
monitored). Combination of elements that represent the ISSRM Threat agent and Attack method (e.g. 
message containing a spy program, Tasks Start spy program and Extract username and password) forms 
a Threat. The latter leads to an impact: the confidentiality of usernames and passwords (Unlock with ‘c’ 
on Data Object).  
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Figure 15. Message Handling Process Including Security Risk Attack 
Risk treatment involves deciding how the identified security flows could be mitigated. In current 
situation we choose a risk reduction decision i.e., actions to lessen the probability of the negative 
consequences. 
Security requirements definition. We implement the activity of message scanning to reduce the 
probability to receive an infected message. If the message scanning (Task Scan incoming message + 
Gateway Secure?) doesn’t show any kind of insecurity, it’s being registered into the system. Otherwise 
the process is cancelled and message is not accepted. The next security requirement is the control of 
database access and occurring activity (Task Control DB activity). If there is a try of unauthorized 
access during the process, it terminates. And the last required implementation is the activity of the traffic 
control (Task Control outgoing traffic) in order to get an information about the exchanged resources. If 
the check shows a problem with traffic, the operation is stopped and the process is cancelled (Cancel 
triggered End Event).  
Control implementation. At current stages of system analysis we don’t propose any control 
implementation; it remains for the future system development phase.  
5.4.2 Availability 
Context and asset identification. In this example we introduce new situation, the process of service 
delivery, performed in the Internet store (see Figure 17). Let’s imagine we have a User (pool User), who 
sends a request for some services (message flow Sending request) that Internet Store provides. We do 
not talk about what services exactly user is requesting due to the reason we are interested in the process 
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flow and not concentrating on details. The normal flow includes receiving the request by a server (task 
Listen for request), if the check reports some problems, server sends an error message to the user (error 
triggered event + message flow Invalid request). Otherwise, the server provides requested service (task 
Provide services), which is a valuable asset of the Internet Store system. 
 
 
Figure 16. Message Handling Process Including Security Requirements. 
Determination of security objectives. In current example we are emphasizing on the availability of 
the services provided by the server of the Internet store system. 
Risk Analysis and assessment. The process including security risk is presented in Figure 18. We 
model the risky scenario by involving the attacker (pool Violator), who uses DoS (Denial of Service) 
attack to harm the system. He sends multiply requests to the system (message flow Sending multiply 
requests) provoking the inability of server to listen and cope with this number of requests at one time, 
what in turn leads to the server being hanged (end event Server is hanged) and services – unavailable for 
users.    
Risk treatment. For the risk treatment we decide to take a decision of risk reduction that hopefully 
will reduce the probability of such a risk. 
Security requirements definition. Figure 19 represents the process of service providing including 
definition of security requirements. We implement the activity of controlling the incoming requests (task 
Control incoming request) which includes filtering and sorting and will prevent server from hanging. So 
the services will stay available for users. 
Control implementation. We don’t propose any control at this stage of system analysis. It remains 
for development stages. 
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Figure 17. Service providing process; assets and security objectives 
 
 
Figure 18. Service providing process; security risk 
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Figure 19. Service providing process; risk treatment 
5.4.3  Integrity 
Context and asset identification. Lets imagine the following situation when User (pool User) 
wishes to use the Internet Store system and sends a request for registration details to administrator. 
Administrator in his turn accepts and reads the message (task Accept message, Read message) and sends 
an answer (task Send answer) with a guidelines of how to perform the registration. The valuable asset of 
this process is a message handling process itself.  
Determination of security objectives. It is considered that the process should include all the above 
mentioned activities and be performed exactly that way how it is depicted in Figure 20. So the security 
criterion we focus on is integrity of the message handling process.      
Risk Analysis and assessment. Figure 21 presents the potential security risk scenario. Let’s 
assume that there exists a violator (pool Violator) who attempts to use the system like a custom user. He 
sends the similar request for registration, but this time it contains a malicious code (message flow 
Registration inquiry + spy malicious code). The execution of a spy program starts after message is 
accepted. The program extracts data from DB and then data is attached to outcoming message to be sent 
back to Violator (task Send answer, message flow Demand for registration + stolen data).  
Risk treatment. For the risk treatment decision we choose risk reduction to lessen the probability of 
risk.  
Security requirements definition. To reduce the probability of described risks some security 
requirements were introduced. More detailed view on this situation is presented in Figure 16. 
Control implementation. Just like it was mentioned in previous example, the identification of the 
controls is postponed for later stages of system development. 
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Figure 20. Process of logging in; assets and security objectives 
 
Figure 21. Process of logging in; security risk definition 
5.5 Summary 
In this Chapter we presented the overview of research method, the extensions on language concrete 
and abstract syntax and the resources developed in the process of this part of study. We result into three 
tables (Table 3-5) that give us a visual demonstration of ISSRM domain coverage after the BPMN 
syntax extension. We can see that Asset-related concepts and Risk-related concepts can be sufficiently 
addressed by security risk-oriented BPMN: major part of security concepts is now covered. We also 
demonstrate the applicability of proposed extensions of Internet Store example, covering three scenarios: 
integrity, confidentiality and availability analysis. 
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Chapter 6. Transformation rules from BPMN to Secure Tropos 
In this chapter we introduce model transformation opportunity from extended BPMN to Secure 
Tropos. The goal of current investigation is to allow security and business analyst to elicit risk in a 
systematic way from different point of view, broaden the horizons for specifying security requirements, 
reason what is the trade-off, and benefit the security requirements regarding the analyzed system. In 
other words, we investigate into providing the stakeholders new opportunities for secure system design. 
As an input for this stage of analysis, we take models previously designed with the help of extended 
version of BPMN, covering confidentiality, integrity and availability. We establish a comprehensive set 
of transformation rules from BPMN to Secure Tropos. And finally we analyze the completeness of 
transformed model with respect to security risk management. More specifically, we make the 
transformation alignment that helps defining what part of the model can be transformed and pointing 
onto losses of any valuable artefacts. 
6.1 Transformation rules 
Analysing the opportunities for transformation of models from BPMN to Secure Tropos, we 
designed a set of comprehensive trasformation rules (Step by step transformation example is presented 
in the Appendix A). However,  not everything can be transformed from one language to another, so 
number of manual changes have to be performed. As an input for transformation process we take 
models, designed in earlier chapters with the help of extended version of BPMN 2.0. The set of defined 
rules is presented below. 
6.1.1 Rules for asset definition 
TR1. Define the stakeholders. Transform BPMN Pools and Lanes to Secure Tropos Actors. BPMN 
Pool/Lane that represents a process participant (e.g. job, name, system) is simply transformed to Actor. 
If BPMN Lanes are used as a representation of different functional parts of one working system, there is 
no need to transform each part, transforming the general naming of described system (often Pool name) 
will be essential in Secure Tropos.  
TR2. Another characteristic of Secure Tropos is ability to define dependencies between Actors. For 
dependencies definition transform each BPMN Task that represent any activity of communication 
between participants (e.g. send, receive, request, get, or any other of that kind) to Secure Tropos Plan, 
which will become a dependum. Dependencies can be also represented by BPMN Message flow with the 
same mission: to send something, request or receive. Transform Message flow to Secure Tropos 
dependums. 
TR3. Next step is to add a direction to previously defined dependencies; to decide who is a 
depender and who is a dependee. A depender in BPMN is usually somebody who performs the action; a 
dependee is the one who depends on this action. In case with the transformation of Message flow, the 
direction of dependency is specified with direction of observed Message flow; if it goes out from the 
Pool that means we are dealing with a depender, and conversely.  
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TR4. Define the Security constraint that will regulate the dependency between Actors. Security 
constraint that depender expects to be satisfied, is transformed from BPMN Security objective. 
TR5. Transform BPMN Tasks to Secure Tropos Plans and add them to the corresponding Actor’s 
boundary; add only Plans that are under responsibility of the observed Actor. 
TR6. Next step is dedicated to completion of Secure Tropos Model with Goals. Goals can be formed 
from already transformed BPMN Tasks, meaning from Plans added on the previous step, or from BPMN 
Tasks. Transform Secure Tropos Goals in the following form of event: Task Request item list to Goal 
Item list requested. 
TR7. Duplicate the Security constraint to the boundary of an Actor. Add Restricts relationship 
between Security constraint and the Goal. This relationship should correspond to the union of BPMN 
Tasks restricted with a Lock defining Security criterion. 
TR8. Define the Softgoal and add it to the Actor’s boundary. The Softgoal should comply with 
Security objective, which is a property of the BPMN Lock. Add Contribution relationship between 
Security constraint and the Softgoal. 
TR9. Add Resources to Secure Tropos model. Resources are transformed from BPMN Data Object 
or Data Store, in other words BPMN Artefacts can be transformed to Secure Tropos Resources. 
As it was mentioned before, Secure Tropos model should be complemented with some manual add-
ons. Define the rest of relationships, such as Decomposition and Means-ends. 
6.1.2 Rules for risk identification 
Next stage of transformations is creating Secure Tropos Risk model from BP Diagram. The latter 
comes as an input. 
TR10. Start from defining the impact of the risk described in BPMN model. Add Secure Tropos 
Threat and the Impacts relationship between Threat and corresponding Security constraint. 
TR11. Basing on the rule TR1, define the attacker as a new Secure Tropos Actor with its boundary. 
TR12. Transform BPMN Tasks (in red) to Secure Tropos Plans that represent an attack method. The 
following rule is based on TR5. It can be also noticed that we do not define any dependencies between 
Agent and other Actors, so BPMN Message flow from the Pool that represents a threat agent can be 
transformed to Secure Tropos Plan. 
TR13. Define the main goal of the attacker from BPMN diagram; it can be formed from Task or 
Event (usually some undesirable end event). Once it is defined, transform it to Secure Tropos Goal. 
TR14. Next step is to detect the Vulnerability point from BP Diagram. Secure Tropos Vulnerability 
point should be added to the Plan (Goal) or Resource that correspond to Task or Artifact that carried the 
vulnerability in BPMN model. Put Exploits relationship between Plan (representing attack method) and 
Vulnerability point. Add the Attacks relationship between the Plan and Resource being attacked.  
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Define the rest of relationships, such as Decomposition and Means-ends in the boundary of an 
attacker. 
6.1.3 Rules for risk treatment solution  
As an input we take asset model in Secure Tropos. Transformation is based on BP Diagram, 
describing treatment options. 
TR15. Transform BPMN Tasks and Gateway structures that represent security requirements into 
Secure Tropos Plans and Goals, basing on rules TR5, TR6. Add (S)-labels to all defined Plans, Goals 
that will emphasize security requirements. 
TR16. Define additional Security constraint(s). It is possible through transforming the BPMN 
Gateway structures that represent security requirements control. 
TR17. Add Satisfies relationship between defined Goal(s) and existing Security constraints. 
TR18. Collapse the risk scenario to an Impact. Add Mitigates relation between Security constraint 
and the Impact. 
Add missing relationships (Decomposition, Means-end) manually to complete the model. 
6.2 Transformation examples  
6.2.1 Availability 
As an input for transformation we receive Figure 22, which represents message handling process in 
Internet Store and modelled with extended version of BPMN. Following the rules TR1-TR3 we define 
Actors and dependencies between them. We decide upon the dependums and emphasize such Secure 
Tropos Plans as Request item list, Provide (display) item list, Select goods from Internet Store that are 
transformed from BPMN Tasks. The decision is based on understanding that current activities represent 
interaction between process participants as defined in the rule TR2. The direction of dependencies is 
defined as follows; as User requests item list and selects goods, he (she) is a depender, and on the 
contrary – a dependee on the Plan Provide item list. Then we define the Security constraint by 
transforming the Annotation Availability of item list to Secure Tropos Security constraint and adding it 
to the corresponding dependency and to the boundary of Internet Store (see TR7). The security 
objective depicted in the Lock is transformed to Softgoal and connected to defined security constraint 
with Contribution relationship. BPMN Tasks located in the Internet Store Pool are transformed to 
Secure Tropos Plans and Goals with respect to rules TR5 and TR6. BPMN Data Object Item list is 
transformed to Resource basing on the rule TR9. The result of transformation is presented in Figure 23. 
It is also important that Secure Tropos presents goal-oriented model not the process flow, which means 
that not everything can be transformed from BPMN. To make the model complete, we add necessary 
relationships, and here we rely mostly on intuition and example context. We start with defining the 
major goal and put Means-end relationship between the Goal and corresponding Plan. We also put 
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Decomposition between Plans and Goals, defining the hierarchy. The version of complete model is 
presented in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 22. BPMN: Availability analysis - Message handling process assets 
 
Figure 23. Secure Tropos: Availability analysis – assets 
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Figure 24. Secure Tropos: Availability analysis - assets (complete) 
Next step is dedicated to risk definition and we take Figure 25 as an input. We continue working 
with asset model (Figure 24) and add an Agent Violator and a new boundary. Following the rule TR12 
we define the attack method by adding the Plan Request item list multiple times and transforming the 
error-triggered End Event to the Goal Internet Store is not capable to handle all requests. Next we 
add a Vulnerability point to the Plan Accept request for item list (complying with the BP Diagram). 
We also add Exploits and Attacks relationships as it is defined in rule TR14. The end result of 
transformations is presented in Figure 26, after some manual add-ons, the final model can be interpreted 
like depicted in Figure 27. However in Secure Tropos there exist an opportunity to represent the defined 
risk using a Threat construct, the following representation is based on the rule TR10 and can be seen in 
Figure 28. 
The final step for Availability example transformation is to describe the treatment scenario – as an 
input we take BPMN model presented in Figure 29. Basing on the asset model (Figure 24) and the rule 
TR15 we add the Plan Check for abnormal request to Internet Store boundary. We handle the 
structure for Gateway Normal? and define the Goal Abnormal request terminated. On this basis, we 
identify the new Security constraint Only normal request allowed (See rule TR16). However this 
security constraint is not transformable from BP Diagram, we consider it to be essential for Secure 
Tropos model. We add Satisfies relationship between the Goal and Security constraint. The result for 
above described transformation is presented in Figure 30. Manually we add relationships, and following 
the rule TR18 define an impact and Mitigates relationship. The final result is presented in Figure 31. 
50 
 
 
 
Figure 25. BPMN: Availability analysis - Denial of service risk 
 
Figure 26. Secure Tropos: Availability analysis – Risk 
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Figure 27. Secure Tropos: Availability analysis – Risk (complete) 
 
Figure 28. Secure Tropos: Availability analysis – Risk (Threat construct) 
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Figure 29. BPMN: Availability analysis - security requirements 
 
Figure 30. Secure Tropos: Availability analysis – security requirements 
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Figure 31. Secure Tropos: Availability analysis – security requirements (complete) 
 
6.2.2 Confidentiality 
The transformation of confidentiality example starts from observation of two BP diagrams: one 
represents the message handling process in the Internet Store (see Figure 32) and another depicts user 
registration process (see Figure 33). As both of the diagrams have value with respect to confidentiality 
analysis, we transform output from both diagrams to create a Secure Tropos model.  
 
Figure 32. BPMN: Confidentiality analysis – Handle request message 
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Figure 33. BPMN: Confidentiality analysis – User registration process 
 
BPMN Pools are transformed to Secure Tropos Actors according to transformation rule TR1. To 
define dependencies between User and Internet Store, we follow the rules TR2 and TR3 and transform 
BPMN Message flows to the following Secure Tropos Plans: Request for username and password and 
Request to register (from Figure 32), as well as Send user info and Send registration 
acknowledgement. The defined dependencies are regulated by Confidentiality of username and 
password Security constraint, which is transformed from corresponding BPMN Security objective. Next 
we define Plans and Goals from corresponding BPMN Tasks according to TR5 and TR6. We duplicate 
the Security constraint into Actor’s boundary and continue transformation with adding the Softgoal, 
translated from BPMN Lock and c-label inside. We supplement the model by adding supporting 
relationships with respect to rules TR7 and TR8 and the following Secure Tropos Resources: User info 
and Database (transformed from corresponding Data Object and Data Store). At this stage we receive a 
final asset model in Secure Tropos (see Figure 34). After performing some manual operations, similar to 
ones described in availability example, we receive the version of complete Secure Tropos model (see 
Figure 35). 
As an input for creation of Secure Tropos risk model we take Figure 36 that represents security risk 
in message handling process, modelled with extended BPMN. We add an Agent and his boundary to 
define the Violator. According to TR12, we transform BPMN Tasks Start spy program and Extract 
username and password to Secure Tropos Plans. Message flow Request for username and 
password is also transformed to Secure Tropos Plan. Next we decide on the main goal of threat agent: 
in current case it is described in the message flow Request to register + username and password 
copied from database. We transform it to Secure Tropos Goal Username and password are copied 
from database.  
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Although the same example in previous analysis had three different vulnerabilities, we will 
concentrate only on Message is handled without any scanning to show the principle of 
transformation but to keep the picture clear. We add the Vulnerability point to corresponding plan and 
define Exploits and Attacks relationships following the guidelines in TR14. The result is presented in 
Figure 37. Add the rest of relations between Goal and Plans manually; possible solution can be seen in 
Figure 38. There is also an opportunity to represent the risk definition using Secure Tropos Threat 
construct and Impacts relationship as it is described in TR10, the result of such representation can be 
found in Figure 39.  
 
Figure 34. Secure Tropos: Confidentiality analysis – assets 
 
Figure 35. Secure Tropos: Confidentiality analysis – assets (complete) 
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Figure 36. BPMN: Confidentiality analysis – Security Risk 
 
Figure 37. Secure Tropos: Confidentiality analysis – risk model 
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Figure 38. Secure Tropos: Confidentiality analysis – risk model (complete) 
 
Figure 39. Secure Tropos: Confidentiality analysis – risk model (Threat construct) 
Model that is taken as an input for treatment scenario is Figure 40. Transformation of BP Diagram 
starts with definition of security requirements from BPMN Tasks to Secure Tropos Plans and Goals 
following the rule TR15. Additional Security constraint Register only trusted messages is defined from 
BPMN Gateway structure controlling the safeness of incoming message. Model is supplemented with 
Satisfies relationships with respect to TR17. In the final version of Secure Tropos model (Figure 41), 
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the risk scenario is collapsed to an Impact and completed with Mitigate relationship. After some manual 
add-ons, relationships between security requirements representing Goals and Plans are defined and can 
be seen in Figure 42.   
 
Figure 40. BPMN: Confidentiality analysis – Security Requirements 
 
Figure 41. Secure Tropos: Confidentiality analysis – Security Requirements 
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Figure 42. Secure Tropos: Confidentiality analysis – Security Requirements (complete) 
6.2.3 Integrity 
The BPMN process for transformation is presented in Figure 43 and Figure 44. Just like in two 
previous examples we start with identification of Actors and dependencies between them. According to 
transformation rules TR2 and TR3 we translate all the Message flows in BP Diagram (Request for 
username and password, Request to register, User info and others) to Secure Tropos Plans and 
basing on the directions of the flows we define dependencies. The main purpose of presented process is 
that Internet Store would be used properly, with respect to that context we transform Task Use Internet 
Store (from Figure 43) to Secure Tropos Plan and Goal (Use Internet Store, Internet Store is used 
properly). We add Security constraint and Softgoal transformed from the BPMN Lock and Annotation. 
We also define the Resource User info. After all the necessary relationships are added and manual work 
is done we receive the complete Secure Tropos asset model in Figure 46 (model without manual work is 
presented in Figure 45). 
 
Figure 43. BPMN: Integrity analysis – asset identification (collapsed process) 
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Figure 44. BPMN: Integrity analysis – asset identification (expanded process) 
 
 
Figure 45. Secure Tropos: Integrity analysis – asset identification 
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Figure 46. Secure Tropos: Integrity analysis – asset identification (complete) 
 
Figure 47 represents the security risk scenario. As the description for current example in previous 
analysis assumes that risk remains the same as it was stated for Confidentiality example, we follow the 
same steps to create Secure Tropos risk model (see description for Figure 37 and Figure 38 
transformation). The end result of this stage is represented in the following figures: Figure 48 represents 
the possible transformation from BP Diagram to Secure Tropos model, Figure 49 proposes manual 
changes, and Figure 50 involves the Threat construct representation. 
 
Figure 47. BPMN: Integrity analysis – security risk 
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Figure 48. Secure Tropos: Integrity analysis – security risk 
 
Figure 49. Secure Tropos: Integrity analysis – security risk (complete) 
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Figure 50. Secure Tropos: Integrity analysis – security risk (Threat construct) 
The treatment decision for current example is also described previously as it is based on 
Confidentiality example (see Figure 41 and Figure 42). The final result including manual add-ons is 
presented in Figure 51. 
 
Figure 51. Secure Tropos: Integrity analysis – risk treatment 
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Table 5. BPMN to Secure Tropos constructs transformation mapping: Asset-related concepts 
ISSRM  
(Concepts, 
Relationships) 
BPMN Secure Tropos 
Asset Combination of 
flow objects, 
coneected with 
sequence flow 
 
Combination of Actor, 
Goal, Plan, Resource 
objects, combined 
using Dependency, 
Contribution, Means-
ends and 
Decomposition links  
Business asset Data object 
 
Resource 
 
 
IS asset 1. Data store          
2. Containers 
(Pools, Lanes) 
 
 
Supports 1. Containers  
(Pools, Lanes) 
2. Sequence flow 
3. Data 
association flow 
 
1. Dependency 
2. Means-ends, 
Decomposition 
 
 
 
 
 
Constraint of Lock + 
Association flow  
Security criterion and 
Restricts relationship 
 
Security objective Label in the lock:  
i-integrity,  
a-availability,  
c-confidentiality 
 
Softgoal 
 
Security criterion Annotation 
 
Softgoal, Security 
criterion, Contribution 
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Table 6. BPMN to Secure Tropos constructs transformation mapping: Risk-related concepts 
ISSRM 
(Concepts, 
Relationships) 
BPMN Secure Tropos 
Risk Combination of 
Event and Impact 
 
Combination of Threat 
and Impacts 
relationship  
Significance 
assessed by 
- - - - 
Event Combination of 
Threat and 
Vulnerability 
 
1) Threat 
2) Combination of Agent, 
Goal, Plan, Targets, 
Exploits and 
Vulnerability point 
1)  
2)  
Targets/leads to  
(leads to harm of 
IS assets) 
Sequence flow, Data 
association flow 
 
Attacks relationship 
 
Leads to 
(leads to harm of 
business assets) 
Sequence flow, Data 
association flow 
 
Attacks relationship 
leading to Resource 
 
Impact/negates Unlock 
 
Combination of Threat, 
Impacts relationship and 
Security criterion 
 
Threat Combination of 
Threat agent and 
Attack method 
 
Combination of Agent, 
Plans, Goals 
 
Exploits Exploits relationship 
 
Exploits relationship 
 
Vulnerability Annotation 
 
- - 
Characteristics 
of 
Vulnerability point + 
association flow  
 
Vulnerability point 
(presented on Goal, Plan, 
Resource) 
 
Threat agent Pool, Lane 
 
Agent  
 
Attack method Combination of flow 
objects 
 
Plan 
 
Uses Data flow 
 
Agent executes Plan 
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Table 7. BPMN to Secure Tropos constructs transformation mapping: Risk treatment-related concepts 
ISSRM  
(Concepts, 
Relationships) 
BPMN Secure Tropos 
Risk treatment - - - - 
Decision to 
treat 
- - - - 
Leads to - - - - 
Security 
requirements 
Combination 
of Flow 
objects + 
sequence 
flow 
 
Combination of 
Plan, Goal, 
Resource, Security 
constraint, Softgoal 
and relationships: 
Contribution, 
Means-end, 
Decomposition 
 
Mitigates Mitigates 
relationship  
Implements - - - - 
Controls - - - - 
 
6.2.4. Summary 
The summary of transformation results is conducted into Table 5 - 7. From the tables and 
demonstration of model translation from one language to another, it can be summarized that 
transformation of BP diagram to Secure Tropos model is possible. The major part of security concepts 
can be easily translated as it is seen from tables below. However complete transformation remains 
impossible. First of all, definition of relationships in Secure Tropos can be performed only manually, 
from the context of running example. The reason for this comes from difference of nature of two 
modelling languages: BPMN depicts process flow and helps to see the sequence of performed activities; 
Secure Tropos in turn gives the static picture of environment, and benefits defining hierarchy and 
decomposition relations between objects, definition of actors and goals. Secondly, there is no 
opportunity to represent Vulnerability in Secure Tropos, which leads to loss of some part of valuable 
information in security analysis. More detailed assessment on the quality of model transformation will 
be given in the Validation part. 
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Chapter 7. Validation of BPMN extensions 
This chapter is dedicated to validity of BPMN extensions proposed earlier in current work. Chapter 
will cover the research method that we used to validate understandability of Security-oriented BPMN, 
description of experiment we held in frames of this research and analysis of resulted dataset.  
7.1 Description of the experiment 
It was decided that understandability validation should be held in form of an exercise. The research 
experiment was organized in Tartu University among student of Software Engineering and Informatics. 
Majority of the participants are the first year master’s students, who have received a degree in Computer 
science, which means person has an understanding of basic software engineering processes, risk 
management and system modelling. In total, ten persons were examined with completely identical 
questions regarding the same example.  
For this case study we designed three different flows of one example and recreated it with the help 
of Security-oriented BP diagrams. These models include normal scenario, potential risk scenario and 
proposal for risk treatment. Participants of the experiment were asked to observe the models and extract 
the asset-, risk- and risk treatment-related issues, following the basis of the ISSRM process, which 
guidance were provided as an additional material. Apart from defining the contextual information of the 
example, it was also assumed that understanding of correspondence between this extracts to visual 
constructs can be defined. This is a reason behind the division oh hypothesis formulation and as a 
consequence also the scope of assessment. First of all we are purposed on receiving the picture of 
understandability of applied semantics: if person can extract valuable information from the model and 
define what are the security assets, threat agent, vulnerabilities etc. And secondly we are interested to 
see if person is able to understand the applicability of the language extensions: meaning to match 
extracted information with visual representation.  
Participants received a question sheet with three models and tables with corresponding fill-in fields. 
They were also provided an additional material that introduced the concrete and abstract syntax of 
designed extensions and gave an overview on basic steps of ISSRM process. The formulation of 
exercise was to fill in the gaps in two table columns, according the requested information. 
7.2 Introducing the variables and assessment  
As the independent variables we introduce the scale for evaluation of the correctness of given 
answers to assess the understandability percentage for above mentioned aspects. Each correct answer 
gives one point, which means that information is understood for more than 75%, although we assume 
that some infelicities are possible to make in frames of given answer. In case if no answer is given or 
given answer is not correct, it is assessed with 0 points, which means understanding of information is 
less than 25%. Other cases are covered in the Table 8, which is located below. The correct extraction of 
information for both, asset- and risk treatment concepts gives maximum 3 points for example context 
identification and 3 more points for the correct definition of visual constructs. Risk-related concepts give 
maximum 7 points for each column; it means 14 points in total. Once the answers are checked for 
correctness, the understandability percent can be counted. We validate the understandability of used 
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language by finding the average from the right answers (points) for each model and transforming the 
number to percentage basing on the total possible sum. 
                       
   
    
    , where 
AvP is average number of points gained for identification of either a visual construct or its meaning 
in the example context. Another opportunity is to assess the understandability of the whole diagram, and 
for each diagram separately (e.g. asset-related model). MaxP stands for maximum possible number of 
points in concrete set of questions. Data conducted from exercise sheets is represented in Appendix B. 
The major extracts will be highlighted below. 
Table 8. Scale for understandability assessment 
Scale Criteria 
0 No answer or completely wrong answer 
0,25 ¼ part of the answer is right: person captures the relatively small idea in the right 
direction; person captures only small part of the right answer or proposes this idea in a 
row with wrong ideas.  
0,5 Only half of the answer is right: person captures just a part of the right idea, it can be 
presented separately or in a row with a wrong idea in relation of 1 to 1. 
0,75 Person captures the idea of correct answer, but represents the small deviation from the 
right direction; person suggests right idea with less than 3 small infelicities; person 
suggests the ¾ of the right answer or number of the right answers. 
1 Person gives completely right answer or the right answer with a small infelicity 
7.3 Data interpretation 
Answers, which were evaluated according to the above described scale, were conducted together in 
the separate spreadsheet file. Once the data was structured and organized, we can define the 
understandability percent for each concept separately or for the whole diagram. 
Asset model. The following concepts were expected to be correctly extracted from Asset model: IS 
Asset, Business Asset and Security criterion (see Table 9). Identification of business asset from the 
model was performed successfully: nine of ten participants defined it correctly, which gave the value of 
90% for understandability. However, the security criterion presentation was not so obvious for majority 
of the participants; it gained only 20% in understandability for its visual representation. The overall asset 
model semantics is understandable for 68%, and visual representation of the model – for 53%. 
Risk model. Understandability of Risk model included the correct definition of Risk, Impact, Event, 
Threat, Vulnerability, Threat agent and Attack method. The overview of data set shows that the 
percentage of understood semantics for such concepts as Risk, Impact, Threat, Threat Agent and Attack 
method is high, which means it is equal or more than 80 (see Table 10). However the understandability 
for visual representation of the same concepts varies from 47% to 100%; it shows that some of the 
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constructs are more essential and natural to detect from the diagram (or example context) than others. It 
also points on the idea that definition of semantics comes easier; sometimes semantic meaning can be 
(or even should be) extracted not from the model itself, but from the example situation. So the definition 
of semantics aspect remains more flexible. Understandability percent for the remaining concepts stays 
between 50% and 70% for semantics as well as for visual representation. The overall model is visually 
understandable for 65% and contextually for 80%. 
Risk treatment model. The lowest percent of understandability is presented in data extracted from 
Risk treatment model (Table 11). We believe that the reason behind that is a lack of resources 
investigated into this aspect in frames of our current analysis; definition of extensions for risk treatment 
modelling remained out of scope. Risk treatment and Security criterion concepts gained 22% in 
understandability of semantics and higher percent for graphical representation correspondingly 55% and 
44%. The concept we defined in frames of designing the language extensions is Security requirement, 
which was semantically understood for 100%, visually but for 78%. Risk treatment related model 
semantics is understandable for 48%, visual representation – for 59%. 
 
Table 9. Asset model’s understandability (in %) 
Person ID Business asset IS asset security criterion 
semantic visual semantic visual semantic visual 
1 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 1,00 1,00 
2 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,50 0,00 1,00 
3 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 1,00 0,00 
4 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 1,00 0,00 
5 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 1,00 0,00 
6 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 1,00 0,00 
7 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,00 0,00 
8 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 0,00 0,00 
9 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 1,00 0,00 
10 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 0,00 0,00 
avg 0,90 0,90 0,55 0,50 0,60 0,20 
max 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
% 90 90 55 50 60 20 
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Table 10. Risk  model’s understandability (in %) 
P
er
so
n
 I
D
 
Risk Impact Event Threat 
Vulnera-
bility 
Threat 
Agent 
Attack 
method 
sem vis sem vis sem vis sem vis sem vis sem vis sem vis 
1 0,75 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,50 0,50 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,00 
2 0,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,75 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,00 
3 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,75 0,25 1,00 0,00 0,50 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
4 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 0,25 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
5 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,50 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
6 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,75 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
7 1,00 0,25 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 
8 0,75 0,75 1,00 0,75 0,50 0,50 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 
9 0,75 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
10 0,25 0,25 1,00 0,75 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
avg 0,83 0,73 0,85 0,48 0,70 0,50 0,80 0,65 0,60 0,60 1,00 1,00 0,80 0,60 
max 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
% 83 73 85 48 70 50 80 65 60 60 100 100 80 60 
 
Table 11. Treatment  model’s understandability (in %) 
Person ID Risk treatment Security requirement Security criterion 
semantic visual semantic visual semantic visual 
1 1,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 
2 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 
3 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 
4 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
5 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
6 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 
7 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 
8 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 
9 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
10 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
avg 0,22 0,56 1,00 0,78 0,22 0,44 
max 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
% 22 55 100 77 22 44 
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7.3 Threads to validity 
Our proposal for BPMN extensions contains a certain degree of subjectivity, which is a major threat 
to validity in current part of the study. We assume that at least three aspects of that research are 
influenced. First of all we can speak about the subjectivity of the input for the above described 
experiment; the study on BPMN alignment to security and the proposed extensions are performed by 
two researchers only, which means the solution can be interpreted, aligned and designed differently from 
the perspective of another knowledge domains, experience and backgrounds. On the other hand, 
experiment involves participation of ten different people. However, the similar knowledge backgrounds 
and relatively small number of students involved into the research also raise the question of subjectivity. 
And finally, the scale for results analysis and data interpretation cannot be objective for the similar 
reasons.  
7.4 Data analysis results 
The validation of extensions’ understandability from two points of view shows that majority of 
security risk-related concepts are understandable and can be successfully extracted from the models with 
respect to language semantics as well as to its visual representation. However during the analysis of 
experiment resources (exercise sheets, data set) we discovered some difficulties that potentially had an 
influence on the understandability percentage. For instance the practice shows that use of the same 
graphical construct for presentation of different ISSRM concepts (despite the fact that different colours 
were used) makes questions and misunderstandings. We believe that it has an influence on the definition 
of such concepts as Security criterion and Vulnerability. Although contextually these concepts are not 
easy to mess up, the representation of both with the help of BPMN Annotation highlights the risk of 
wrong interpretation. Another problem is that some information is not presented in the models, but 
required to be extracted from the context, such as Risk treatment for example. We did not define any 
visual construct for definition of Risk treatment; however it can be extracted logically basing on the 
actions defined for the security requirements. Identification of such information may require additional 
experience and skills in working with this kind of analysis. Obviously it was the reason behind such a 
low percentage of correctly stated answers. And finally, it is not easy to define the border between what 
can be logically extracted from the example, and what is out of scope. With respect to this issue, we 
faced the problem of internal information involvement, for example some attempts to define Controls. 
To conclude, we believe that proposed extensions are understandable and applicable to model security. 
However the improvement of representation abilities and review of scope remains for the future work. 
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Chapter 8. Transformation quality assessment 
In this chapter we will give the evaluation to the quality of transformed models. We will emphasize 
on comparison between Secure Tropos model, created essentially from the example context and the 
model received from BPMN via translation based on transformation rules described in Chapter 6. Our 
analysis is based on predefined assessment criteria, which will be introduced further in this chapter. We 
also give an overview of research method and main evaluation goals. 
8.1 Research method 
Our research method is based on the approach presented in (Matulevičius 
et al, 2011). More specifically we adapt four steps from the introduced process 
to form our research method. The first step is dedicated to definition of 
evaluation goals. As it is stated in the above mentioned paper, it covers the 
understanding of security needs, learning of the quality and scope of security 
models and also the aspect we are concentrating on - comparison of security 
models according to assessment criteria. After major goals are defined, we 
move to the identification of the quality assessment criteria, which will be 
introduced later in the next section. We use the example models that were 
developed in frames of this study to perform the evaluation. Once the 
evaluation is complete, we perform the analysis of the results and lead to 
conclusions, where we decide, whether our evaluation goals are satisfied or 
not. The steps of our research method are presented in Figure 52.  
 
8.2 Evaluation goals 
First of all, we are interested in giving the assessment and learning about the quality of two models: 
(i) Secure Tropos model created from the textual context of familiar example (confidentiality analysis in 
the Internet Store) and (ii) model transformed from BP Diagram to Secure Tropos. In this purposes we 
will compare these models with respect to its informational value, more specifically we will operate with 
the numbers of security concepts used in one or another model aligning it with ISSRM. And finally we 
are aimed on giving the assessment on the transformation results; what value has the transformed model 
in comparison to the model originally created in Secure Tropos.   
8.3 Quality evaluation criteria 
For evaluation we have chosen three types of quality criteria, models will be assessed with respect to 
its semantic and syntactic quality. The semantic quality stands for the correspondence between the 
model and the semantic domain it was aligned to, in our case we deal with ISSRM. We assess semantic 
quality by defining the semantic completeness and semantic correctness of the security model. The 
semantic completeness stands for the percentage of ISSRM concepts covered by the semantics of the 
language used to create the model. It is calculated as follows: number of ISSRM security concepts used 
in the model will be divided by total number of security concepts defined in the scope of this research. 
1. Define the Evaluation 
goals 
2. Identify the quality 
evaluation criteria 
3. Perform evaluation of 
the security models 
4. Analyze the results. 
Conclude 
Figure 52. Quality 
assessment process (adapted 
from Matulevičius et al, 2011) 
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The semantic correctness will give a picture on correlation of used security-related statements to the 
overall model semantics. In other words it requires the separation of the informational resources of the 
model between ones that represent data, and those which stand for security. 
Assessment of syntactic quality of the model is based on definition of correspondence between the 
model and used modelling language. We assess models with respect to its syntactic validity and 
completeness. First assessment criteria defined the check that grammatical expression used to create 
model belongs to the modelling language. In this case we address the numbers of syntactically valid and 
syntactically invalid statements. The number of syntactically invalid statements influences on the quality 
of the model in the following proportionality; the more syntactically invalid statements are discovered in 
the model, the lower is the quality of it. The syntactic completeness in turn refers to the fulfillness of the 
grammar structures, meaning that all the parts are presented within the construct. Concerning the 
number of syntactically complete and incomplete statements, the assessment criterion is applied 
similarly to the previous and adapts the same proportionality regarding the quality of the model.  
8.4 Analysis of evaluation results 
In this section we will give an assessment based on the comparison between two sets of models. 
First of all, we address Secure Tropos models designed in Chapter 6; models that were transformed from 
BPMN to Secure Tropos according to the transformation rules (see section 6.1). In order to avoid the 
overload of this chapter we will not duplicate the models, so please turn back to Figures 35, 38, 39, 42. 
The second set of models (see Figures 53-56) was originally created with Secure Tropos from the same 
example context that was used previously for BPMN confidentiality analysis example creation. These 
models represent so called “perfect model” view, which means we assume first of all the correctness and 
appropriateness of the used language, and secondly, we believe that these models sufficiently and also 
correctly address the ISRRM domain alignment. So it will be taken for base for future assessment.  
We start our evaluation with analysis of semantic quality for two sets of models. To present the 
semantic completeness we count the number of security concepts in each model with respect to ISSRM 
domain coverage (see Table 12). Basing on (Matulevičius et al., 2012), ISSRM domain represents 7 
asset-related, 13 risk-related and 7 risk treatment-related concepts and relations, each of this values 
stands for 100% coverage. Our analysis shows the following: the semantic completeness of transformed 
model is 100% for asset related concepts, 77% for risk-related and 14% for risk treatment-related 
concepts. Semantic completeness of Secure Tropos models is correspondingly 100%, 92% and 43%. 
According to our estimations, transformed asset model as well as original Secure Tropos asset model is 
100% semantically correct, that tells about the success of transformation. More specifically, we assume 
that we do not lose any valuable information regarding system assets when transforming a model from 
BPMN to Secure Tropos. The difference in percentage of semantic correctness in risk models indicated 
majorly because of various ways for Vulnerability concept representation. In our research we didn’t find 
an opportunity to present the vulnerability in Secure Tropos in the transformation process. However 
authors of (Matulevičius et al., 2012) propose to use vulnerability point to express vulnerability itself, 
we consider that it doesn’t give sufficient information of the system weakness, but just gives a signal. 
We respect the authors’ proposal and assume that for perfect model there exist a construct for 
77 
 
Vulnerability. Moreover, in the previous stages there was no defined construct for Significance assessed 
by relationship for both Secure Tropos and BPMN, so it was not covered by semantics of the languages, 
which reduces the percent of semantic completeness. Regarding the risk treatment model, it can be 
mentioned that major part of concepts were not represented in BPMN nor in Secure Tropos, however the 
original Secure Tropos model still covers the higher percentage of ISSRM domain; in addition to 
Security requirements concept, Mitigates relationship and Controls concept can be also addressed.  
Next we assess the semantic correctness of the models by counting the number of constructs used 
for expression of one or another security concept. This part of the research is presented in the diagrams 
below (Figure 57) for a better view on differences in numbers we were able to discover.  Two columns 
of the diagrams (green, orange colours on the plot) stand for two types of models that were discussed 
before. Numbers above the columns are the number of constructs, used to express ISSRM concepts. The 
data shows that the number of construct for two sets of models is nearly the same, but there is a tendency 
that model originally created in Secure Tropos (in green) uses less constructs to represent the security 
concepts such as Asset, Security requirements and also Supports relationship (see Figure 57). The only 
exception is Vulnerability concept, which was mentioned already before in semantic completeness 
analysis. Such kind of resource division seems logical to us, because we assume that in a row with some 
advantages, transformation will cause the overload of the model with extra element that can be 
considered as excess or waste. However the major idea remains the possibility for analysts to read and 
understand the model and also to extract necessary information. At that point, the difference in numbers 
of used constructs is not large; we are not dealing with overlapping semantics neither in transformed 
models, nor in original Secure Tropos model. 
8.5 Threads to validity 
The major limitation of this part of research is the scope. Due to the lack of time resource, we were 
able to apply the transformation rules to confidentiality example only. The transformation is realised in 
only one direction; reverse transformation from Secure Tropos to BPMN is not performed and remains 
for the future research. We see the need to investigate into transformation of other examples, and we 
also would like to involve a group of people that could try on practice the transformation according to 
the rules we defined. Unfortunately we didn’t find the opportunity before with respect to time stamps 
and other resources.  
Another threat to validity is also subjectivity; the set of transformation rules, examples and analysis 
were performed by only two researchers. We believe that this part of validation could be also performed 
in a form of experiment to investigate the model understandability and modifiability. However, the 
design and organization of this experiment remains for the future research and we decide to limit the 
validation with analysis on above selected criteria, defining the semantic quality of the models. 
  
78 
 
Table 12. Assessment on model semantic completeness (1-construct exists, 0-no construct) 
 Transformed Models 
BPMN→SecureTropos 
Secure Tropos 
models 
Asset 1 1 
Business asset 1 1 
IS asset 1 1 
Supports 1 1 
Constraint of 1 1 
Security objective 1 1 
Security criterion 1 1 
Asset model: 
Semantically complete (%) 
100 100 
Risk 1 1 
Significance assessed by 0 0 
Event 1 1 
Targets/leads to(leads to harm of IS assets)  1 1 
Leads to (leads to harm of business assets) 1 1 
Impact/negates 1 1 
Threat 1 1 
Exploits 1 1 
Vulnerability 0 1 
Characteristics of 1 1 
Threat agent 1 1 
Attack method 1 1 
Uses 1 1 
Risk model: 
Semantically complete (%)  
76,9 92,3 
Risk treatment 0 0 
Decision to treat 0 0 
Leads to 0 0 
Security requirements 1 1 
Mitigates 0 1 
Implements 0 0 
Controls 0 1 
Risk treatment model: 
Semantically complete (%) 
14,3 42,8 
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Figure 53. Secure Tropos: Asset identification – confidentiality (created originally in Secure 
Tropos) 
 
Figure 54. Secure Tropos: Risk identification – confidentiality (created originally in Secure Tropos) 
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Figure 55. Secure Tropos: Risk identification (collapsed to Impact concept) – confidentiality 
(created originally in Secure Tropos) 
 
Figure 56. Secure Tropos: Risk Treatment – confidentiality (created originally in Secure Tropos) 
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Figure 57. Semantic correctness of models (number of elements used to express ISSRM concepts)
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8.6 Summary 
In can be summarized that percentage for semantically complete statements is higher for risk and 
risk treatment models, however taking into account the above described reasons for such a difference, 
we can assume that transformation is completely possible and will bring the value compatible with the 
perfect model. We believe that above performed analysis confirms that asset model can be successfully 
transformed from BPMN to Secure Tropos without any losses. Risk and risk treatment models have 
small loss of informational value, regarding such concepts as Vulnerability that could not be transformed 
from BP diagram and risk treatment-related concept Controls, which was not initially defined for 
BPMN. It was also noticed that transformed model use more resources for representation of some 
security concept, but the difference in numbers is insufficient and the main objective was still directed to 
learning the general possibility for model transformation, which is available according to our 
assessment.  
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Chapter 9. Conclusions 
9.1 Limitations 
In this study we are dealing with a limitation of the scope. The study is concentrated on the BPMN 
descriptive modelling, remaining other levels like analytical and executable modelling for the future 
research. We also concentrate on the familiar Internet Store example, limiting the business view of 
language applicability.  
The use of BPMN extensions is demonstrated on examples including all the three major security 
criteria, confidentiality, availability and integrity, however only one criterion is covered by 
transformation example. In addition we have chosen only one transformation scenario, which represents 
the translation of model from BPMN to Secure Tropos. We acknowledge the importance to investigate 
the other possible transformations, such as a reverse transformation from Secure Tropos (Matulevičius et 
al., 2008b; 2012), as well as different combinations of other security oriented modelling languages like 
Mal-Activity diagrams (Chowdhury et al., 2012), KAOS extensions to security (Mayer, 2009), misuse 
cases (Matulevičius et al., 2008a; Soomro and Ahmed, 2012) or others. 
9.2 Conclusions 
The idea for current study was guided by two major research questions. One of them was the 
proposal of extensions for BPMN with respect to security engineering. Basing on our previous analysis 
(Altuhhova et al., 2012) we defined the ability of BPMN 2.0 to express different security concepts and 
made a conclusion that existing language doesn’t cover the ISSRM domain sufficiently. In this work we 
defined additional constructs and relationships that can be used to cover the bigger part of security 
domain with respect to informational value of the models. We succeeded to cover the majority of asset- 
and risk-related concepts, but risk treatment-related concepts were not covered with a scope of current 
research. To investigate this research question we started with overview of existing security 
managements techniques, such as CORAS (Lund et al, 2010), Automated and Utility Manager (Elkhart 
et al, 2009), also Goal-Risk driven Assessment (Asnar et al, 2011) and finally ISSRM (Dubois et al, 
2010) in order to perform the comparison between these techniques and explain the decision for ISSRM 
to be used in our research. The next step was dedicated to introduction on business processes and 
resource for its modeling. We observe four modelling languages, including UML (Börger et al., 2000), 
YAWL (Aalst et al., 2005), EPC (Seel et al., 2005) and BPMN (Silver, 2009) and provide a comparison 
to reason the choice of BPMN for the research. We then provide a short analysis of our previous results 
(Altuhhova et al, 2012) and give an overview on related studies of BPMN and security. As it was 
mentioned above, we introduce the extensions to BPMN language on semantic, concrete and abstract 
levels, covering the ISSRM domain with missing concepts. The use of proposed extensions is illustrated 
and examined on running examples and validated in a form of experiment. The validation results show 
that  
 On the other hand, we emphasized the possibility for transformation of security models from 
BPMN to Secure Tropos, which allows switching the view from the process flow to a static goal-
oriented model. For that purposes we created an Internet Store example with the help of extended 
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BPMN and transformed the model into Secure Tropos, following the set of predefined transformation 
rules. To assess the quality of resulted model, we created Secure Tropos model from original context 
and used it for the comparison. We addressed the semantic completeness and correctness of two Secure 
Tropos model sets. The percentage for semantic completeness is high for both, transformed and original 
Secure Tropos models, regarding asset- and risk related concepts. The low percentage for risk-treatment 
related concepts is justified with the fact that neither Secure Tropos nor BPMN alignment with ISSRM 
was focused on risk treatment-related concepts. The small difference in percentage is caused by the 
absence of one (or maximum two) security concepts in transformed model, which, like we concluded, 
doesn’t have a big impact on model informational value regarding security concerns. With respect to 
semantic correctness, it can be summarized that numbers of concepts representing one or another aspect 
are slightly different for some ISSRM concepts, but majority of concepts have close numbers of 
constructs used to express one or another ISSRM concept. So we concluded that (i) model can be 
successfully transformed from BPMN to Secure Tropos, (ii) the informational value of two models is 
slightly different, however it can be said that difference in percentage is not essential and doesn’t have a 
serious impact.  
9.3 Future work 
As we already discussed in the work limitation section, we would like to investigate into two other 
levels of BPMN, analytical and executable modelling that possibly will open a new and interesting view 
on business process modelling and security analysis in business processes. Next step will be the further 
study on transformation possibilities. We would like to perform the reverse transformation for Secure 
Tropos and BPMN, and also investigate into some other security oriented languages from that 
perspective. Hopefully it will require the additional validation, so planning and designing of the 
experiment to validate the quality and importance of transformed models will be also held in future. 
The most enthusiastic idea for the future work still remains a creation of a modelling tool, 
supporting extended BPMN as well as number of other security oriented languages, and allowing 
generating the models from different points of view, or transforming model from one language to 
another. 
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Rezümee 
Modelleerimiskeele laienduste väljatöötamine turvalisuse riskide juhtimiseks 
äriprotsesside analüüsimisel 
Olga Altuhhova 
Magistritöö 
Kaasaegsed infosüsteemide arendamise metoodikad hõlmavad erinevaid tehnilisi äriprotsesside 
modelleerimise meetmeid.  Äriprotsesside modelleerimiseks kasutatav keel (BPMN1) on tänapäeval 
muutunud üheks standartseks meetmeks, mis edukalt rakendatakse infosüsteemide loomisel ning edasi 
arendamisel selleks, et ettevõtete äriprotsesse kirjeldada ja modelleerida.Vaatamata sellele, et BPMN on 
hea töörist, mille abil on võimalik ettevõtte äriprotsesse mõistma ja esitama, see ei võimalda 
äriprotsesside modelleerimisel adresseerida süsteemi turvalisuse aspekte. Autor leiab, et see on BPMN 
nõrk külg, selle pärast, et turvalise infosüsteemi arendamiseks on oluline nii äriprotsesse kui ka süsteemi 
turvalisust vaadeldada tervikuna. Käesolevas magistritöös autor töötab välja BPMN 2.0 keele jaoks uusi 
elemente, mis edaspidi peavad võimaldama adresseerima turvalisuse temaatika süsteemi 
modelleerimisel. Autori pakutud  lahendus põhineb BPMN  modelleerimiskeele seostamisel  turvalisuse 
riski juhendamise metoodikaga (ISSRM). Antud magistritöös rakendatakse struktureeritud lähenemine 
BPMN peamiste aspektide analüüsimisel ja turvalisuse riskide juhtimiseks uute elementide 
väljatöötamisel, selleks ühildades BPMN ning ISSRM-i kontsepte.  
Magistritöös on demonstreeritud väljatöötatud lisaelementide kasutus, selgitatud kuidas antud 
elementidega laiendatud BPMN võimaldab väljendada ettevõtte varasid (assets), nendega seotuid riske 
(risks) ja riskide käsitlust (risk treatment). See on analüüsitud internetkaupluse varade 
konfidentsiaalsuse, terviklikkuse ja kättesaadavuse näitel. Autor on veendunud, et BPMN laienemine 
turvalisuse kontseptide osas ja antud töö raames tehtud konkreetsed ettepanekud aitavad infosüsteemide 
analüütikutele mõistma kuidas süsteemi turvalisust arendada nii, et läbi äriprotsessi tuvastatud 
olulisemate ettevõtte varade turvalisus oleks infosüsteemis käsitletud ning tagatud. Autori poolt antud 
käsitlus on vaadeldud ka laiemas mõttes, nimelt, BPMN keelele pakutud  laienemisega avaneb 
perspektiiv äriprotsesside ja turvalisuse mudeleite koosvõimele ning BPMN-i teiste modelleerimise 
metoodikatega, nagu ISSRM või Secure Tropos, integreerimisele. 
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Appendix A 
The following Appendix is a part of “An Extension of Business Process Model and Notation for 
Security Risk Management” study. It demonstrates the step by step model transformation from security 
risk-oriented BPMN to Secure. It covers transformation of three different business cases, considering 
Internet Store assets availability, integrity and confidentiality. The Appendix is addressed in Chapter 6, and 
represents the extended part of a study described in the chapter, focusing strictly on rules. Description 
regarding the examples contexts is available in the thesis.  
A1. Availability example transformation 
A.1.1 Availability: Assets 
TR1. Define the stakeholders. Transform BPMN Pools and Lanes to Secure Tropos Actors. BPMN 
Pool/Lane that represents a process participant (e.g. job, name, system) is simply transformed to Actor. 
If BPMN Lanes are used as a representation of different functional parts of one working system, there is 
no need to transform each part, transforming the general naming of described system (often Pool name) 
will be essential in Secure Tropos.  
 
TR2. Another characteristic of Secure Tropos is ability to define dependencies between Actors. For 
dependencies definition transform each BPMN Task that represent any activity of communication 
between participants (e.g. send, receive, request, get, or any other of that kind) to Secure Tropos Plan, 
which will become a dependum. Dependencies can be also represented by BPMN Message flow with the 
same mission: to send something, request or receive. Transform Message flow to Secure Tropos 
dependums. 
 
TR3. Next step is to add a direction to previously defined dependencies; to decide who is a depender and 
who is a dependee. A depender in BPMN is usually somebody who performs the action, a dependee is 
the one who depends on this action. In case with the transformation of Message flow, the direction of 
dependency is specified with direction of observed Message flow; if it goes out from the Pool that means 
we are dealing with a depender, and conversely.  
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TR4. Define the Security constraint that will regulate the dependency between Actors. Security constraint 
that depender expects to be satisfied, is transformed from BPMN Security objective. 
 
TR5. Transform BPMN Tasks to Secure Tropos Plans and add them to the corresponding Actor’s 
boundary; add only Plans that are under responsibility of the observed Actor. 
 
TR6. Next step is dedicated to completion of Secure Tropos Model with Goals. Goals can be formed from 
already transformed BPMN Tasks, meaning from Plans added on the previous step, or from BPMN 
Tasks. Transform Secure Tropos Goals in the following form of event: Task Request item list to Goal 
Item list requested. 
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R7. Duplicate the Security constraint to the boundary of an Actor. Add Restricts relationship between 
Security constraint and the Goal. This relationship should correspond to the union of BPMN Tasks 
restricted with a Lock defining Security criterion. 
 
TR8. Define the Softgoal and add it to the Actor’s boundary. The Softgoal should comply with Security 
objective, which is a property of the BPMN Lock. Add Contribution relationship between Security 
constraint and the Softgoal. 
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TR9. Add Resources to Secure Tropos model. Resources are transformed from BPMN Data Object or 
Data Store, in other words BPMN Artefacts can be transformed to Secure Tropos Resources.
 
Tropos model should be complemented with some manual add-ons. Define the rest of relationships, such as 
Decomposition and Means-ends. 
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A.1.2 Availability: Risk 
Next stage of transformations is creating Secure Tropos Risk model from BP Diagram. The latter comes as 
an input. 
TR10. Start from defining the impact of the risk described in BPMN model. Add Secure Tropos Threat and 
the Impacts relationship between Threat and corresponding Security constraint. 
 
TR11. Basing on the rule TR1, define the attacker as a new Secure Tropos Actor with its boundary. 
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TR12. Transform BPMN Tasks to Secure Tropos Plans that represent an attack method. The following rule 
is based on TR5. It can be also noticed that we do not define any dependencies between Agent and other 
Actors, so BPMN Message flow from the Pool that represents a threat agent can be transformed to 
Secure Tropos Plan. 
 
 
TR13. Define the main goal of the attacker from BPMN diagram; it can be formed from Task or Event 
(usually some undesirable end event). Once it is defined, transform it to Secure Tropos Goal. 
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TR14. Next step is to detect the Vulnerability point from BP Diagram. Secure Tropos Vulnerability point 
should be added to the Plan (Goal) or Resource that correspond to Task or Artifact that carried the 
vulnerability in BPMN model. Put Exploits relationship between Plan (representing attack method) and 
Vulnerability point. Add the Attacks relationship between the Plan and Resource being attacked.  
 
Define the rest of relationships, such as Decomposition and Means-ends in the boundary of an attacker. 
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A.1.3 Availability: Risk Treatment 
As an input we take asset model in Secure Tropos. Transformation is based on BP Diagram, describing 
treatment options. 
TR15. Transform BPMN Tasks and Gateway structures that represent security requirements into Secure 
Tropos Plans and Goals, basing on rules TR5, TR6. Add (S)-labels to all defined Plans, Goals that will 
emphasize security requirements. 
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TR16. Define additional Security constraint(s). It is possible through transforming the BPMN Gateway 
structures that represent security requirements control. 
 
TR17. Add Satisfies relationship between defined Goal(s) and existing Security constraints. 
 
TR18. Collapse the risk scenario to an Impact. Add Mitigates relation between Security constraint and the 
Impact. 
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Add missing relationships (Decomposition, Means-end) manually to complete the model. 
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A2. Confidentiality example transformation 
A 2.1 Confidentiality: Assets 
TR1. Define the stakeholders. Transform BPMN Pools and Lanes to Secure Tropos Actors. BPMN 
Pool/Lane that represents a process participant (e.g. job, name, system) is simply transformed to Actor. 
If BPMN Lanes are used as a representation of different functional parts of one working system, there is 
no need to transform each part, transforming the general naming of described system (often Pool name) 
will be essential in Secure Tropos.  
 
TR2. Another characteristic of Secure Tropos is ability to define dependencies between Actors. For 
dependencies definition transform each BPMN Task that represent any activity of communication 
between participants (e.g. send, receive, request, get, or any other of that kind) to Secure Tropos Plan, 
which will become a dependum. Dependencies can be also represented by BPMN Message flow with the 
same mission: to send something, request or receive. Transform Message flow to Secure Tropos 
dependums. 
 
TR3. Next step is to add a direction to previously defined dependencies; to decide who is a depender and 
who is a dependee. A depender in BPMN is usually somebody who performs the action, a dependee is 
the one who depends on this action. In case with the transformation of Message flow, the direction of 
dependency is specified with direction of observed Message flow; if it goes out from the Pool that means 
we are dealing with a depender, and conversely.  
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TR4. Define the Security constraint that will regulate the dependency between Actors. Security constraint 
that depender expects to be satisfied, is transformed from BPMN Security objective. 
 
TR5. Transform BPMN Tasks to Secure Tropos Plans and add them to the corresponding Actor’s 
boundary; add only Plans that are under responsibility of the observed Actor. 
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TR6. Next step is dedicated to completion of Secure Tropos Model with Goals. Goals can be formed from 
already transformed BPMN Tasks, meaning from Plans added on the previous step, or from BPMN 
Tasks. Transform Secure Tropos Goals in the following form of event: Task Request item list to Goal 
Item list requested. 
 
TR7. Duplicate the Security constraint to the boundary of an Actor. Add Restricts relationship between 
Security constraint and the Goal. This relationship should correspond to the union of BPMN Tasks 
restricted with a Lock defining Security criterion. 
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TR8. Define the Softgoal and add it to the Actor’s boundary. The Softgoal should comply with Security 
objective, which is a property of the BPMN Lock. Add Contribution relationship between Security 
constraint and the Softgoal. 
 
TR9. Add Resources to Secure Tropos model. Resources are transformed from BPMN Data Object or 
Data Store, in other words BPMN Artifacts can be transformed to Secure Tropos Resources. 
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As it was mentioned before, Secure Tropos model should be complemented with some manual add-ons. 
Define the rest of relationships, such as Decomposition and Means-ends. 
 
A 2.2 Confidentiality: Risk 
Next stage of transformations is creating Secure Tropos Risk model from BP Diagram. The latter comes as 
an input. 
TR10. Start from defining the impact of the risk described in BPMN model. Add Secure Tropos Threat and 
the Impacts relationship between Threat and corresponding Security constraint. 
 
TR11. Basing on the rule TR1, define the attacker as a new Secure Tropos Actor with its boundary. 
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TR12. Transform BPMN Tasks (in red) to Secure Tropos Plans that represent an attack method. The 
following rule is based on TR5. It can be also noticed that we do not define any dependencies between 
Agent and other Actors, so BPMN Message flow from the Pool that represents a threat agent can be 
transformed to Secure Tropos Plan. 
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TR13. Define the main goal of the attacker from BPMN diagram; it can be formed from Task or Event 
(usually some undesirable end event). Once it is defined, transform it to Secure Tropos Goal. 
 
TR14. Next step is to detect the Vulnerability point from BP Diagram. Secure Tropos Vulnerability 
point should be added to the Plan (Goal) or Resource that correspond to Task or Artifact that carried the 
vulnerability in BPMN model. Put Exploits relationship between Plan (representing attack method) and 
Vulnerability point. Add the Attacks relationship between the Plan and Resource being attacked. 
 
Define the rest of relationships, such as Decomposition and Means-ends in the boundary of an attacker. 
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A 2.3 Confidentiality: Risk Treatment 
As an input we take asset model in Secure Tropos. Transformation is based on BP Diagram, describing 
treatment options. 
TR15. Transform BPMN Tasks and Gateway structures that represent security requirements into Secure 
Tropos Plans and Goals, basing on rules TR5, TR6. Add (S)-labels to all defined Plans, Goals that will 
emphasize security requirements. 
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TR16. Define additional Security constraint(s). It is possible through transforming the BPMN Gateway 
structures that represent security requirements control. 
 
TR17. Add Satisfies relationship between defined Goal(s) and existing Security constraints. 
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TR18. Collapse the risk scenario to an Impact. Add Mitigates relation between Security constraint and 
the Impact. 
 
Add missing relationships (Decomposition, Means-end) manually to complete the model. 
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A3. Integrity example transformation 
A 3.1 Integrity: Assets 
TR1. Define the stakeholders. Transform BPMN Pools and Lanes to Secure Tropos Actors. BPMN 
Pool/Lane that represents a process participant (e.g. job, name, system) is simply transformed to Actor. 
If BPMN Lanes are used as a representation of different functional parts of one working system, there is 
no need to transform each part, transforming the general naming of described system (often Pool name) 
will be essential in Secure Tropos.  
 
TR2. Another characteristic of Secure Tropos is ability to define dependencies between Actors. For 
dependencies definition transform each BPMN Task that represent any activity of communication 
between participants (e.g. send, receive, request, get, or any other of that kind) to Secure Tropos Plan, 
which will become a dependum. Dependencies can be also represented by BPMN Message flow with the 
same mission: to send something, request or receive. Transform Message flow to Secure Tropos 
dependums. 
 
TR3. Next step is to add a direction to previously defined dependencies; to decide who is a depender and 
who is a dependee. A depender in BPMN is usually somebody who performs the action, a dependee is 
the one who depends on this action. In case with the transformation of Message flow, the direction of 
dependency is specified with direction of observed Message flow; if it goes out from the Pool that means 
we are dealing with a depender, and conversely.  
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TR4. Define the Security constraint that will regulate the dependency between Actors. Security constraint 
that depender expects to be satisfied, is transformed from BPMN Security objective. 
 
TR5. Transform BPMN Tasks to Secure Tropos Plans and add them to the corresponding Actor’s 
boundary; add only Plans that are under responsibility of the observed Actor. 
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TR6. Next step is dedicated to completion of Secure Tropos Model with Goals. Goals can be formed from 
already transformed BPMN Tasks, meaning from Plans added on the previous step, or from BPMN 
Tasks. Transform Secure Tropos Goals in the following form of event: Task Request item list to Goal 
Item list requested. 
 
TR7. Duplicate the Security constraint to the boundary of an Actor. Add Restricts relationship between 
Security constraint and the Goal. This relationship should correspond to the union of BPMN Tasks 
restricted with a Lock defining Security criterion. 
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TR8. Define the Softgoal and add it to the Actor’s boundary. The Softgoal should comply with Security 
objective, which is a property of the BPMN Lock. Add Contribution relationship between Security 
constraint and the Softgoal. 
 
 
TR9. Add Resources to Secure Tropos model. Resources are transformed from BPMN Data Object or 
Data Store, in other words BPMN Artifacts can be transformed to Secure Tropos Resources. 
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As it was mentioned before, Secure Tropos model should be complemented with some manual add-ons. 
Define the rest of relationships, such as Decomposition and Means-ends. 
 
A 3.2 Integrity: Risk 
Next stage of transformations is creating Secure Tropos Risk model from BP Diagram. The latter comes as 
an input. 
TR10. Start from defining the impact of the risk described in BPMN model. Add Secure Tropos Threat and 
the Impacts relationship between Threat and corresponding Security constraint. 
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TR11. Basing on the rule TR1, define the attacker as a new Secure Tropos Actor with its boundary. 
 
TR12. Transform BPMN Tasks (in red) to Secure Tropos Plans that represent an attack method. The 
following rule is based on TR5. It can be also noticed that we do not define any dependencies between 
Agent and other Actors, so BPMN Message flow from the Pool that represents a threat agent can be 
transformed to Secure Tropos Plan. 
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TR13. Define the main goal of the attacker from BPMN diagram; it can be formed from Task or Event 
(usually some undesirable end event). Once it is defined, transform it to Secure Tropos Goal. 
 
TR14. Next step is to detect the Vulnerability point from BP Diagram. Secure Tropos Vulnerability point 
should be added to the Plan (Goal) or Resource that correspond to Task or Artifact that carried the 
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vulnerability in BPMN model. Put Exploits relationship between Plan (representing attack method) and 
Vulnerability point. Add the Attacks relationship between the Plan and Resource being attacked. 
  
 
Define the rest of relationships, such as Decomposition and Means-ends in the boundary of an attacker. 
 
117 
 
A 3.3Integrity: Risk Treatment 
As an input we take asset model in Secure Tropos. Transformation is based on BP Diagram, describing 
treatment options. 
TR15. Transform BPMN Tasks and Gateway structures that represent security requirements into Secure 
Tropos Plans and Goals, basing on rules TR5, TR6. Add (S)-labels to all defined Plans, Goals that will 
emphasize security requirements. 
 
TR16. Define additional Security constraint(s). It is possible through transforming the BPMN Gateway 
structures that represent security requirements control. 
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TR17. Add Satisfies relationship between defined Goal(s) and existing Security constraints. 
 
TR18. Collapse the risk scenario to an Impact. Add Mitigates relation between Security constraint and 
the Impact. Add missing relationships (Decomposition, Means-end) manually to complete the model. 
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